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AGAINST NOTICE SKEPTICISM IN PRIVACY
(AND ELSEWHERE)
M. Ryan Calo*
INTRODUCTION
What follows is an exploration of innovative new ways to deliver
privacy notice. Unlike traditional notice that relies upon text or sym-
bols to convey information, emerging strategies of "visceral" notice
leverage a consumer's very experience of a product or service to warn
or inform. A regulation might require that a cell phone camera make
a shutter sound so people know their photo is being taken.' Or a law
could incentivize websites to be more formal (as opposed to casual)
wherever they collect personal information, as formality tends to place
people on greater guard about what they disclose.2 The thesis of this
Article is that, for a variety of reasons, experience as a form of privacy
disclosure is worthy of further study before we give in to calls to aban-
don notice as a regulatory strategy in privacy and elsewhere.
The requirement to provide notice is a very common method of
regulation.3 Notice mandates arise in everything from criminal proce-
@ 2012 M. Ryan Calo. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Center for Internet and Society, Stanford Law School. I am grateful for the
comments and ideas of Carl Schneider, Lauren Willis, Richard Craswell, Michael
Froomkin, Barbara van Schewick, Lawrence Lessig, Sam Bray, Berin Szoka, Rhett
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1 A similar bill was proposed in the United States that would have required cell
phone cameras to make an audible shutter sound. See Camera Predator Alert Act of
2009, H.R. 414, 111th Cong. (2009); see also infra notes 45-54 and accompanying text
(discussing familiarity as warning).
2 See Leslie K. John et al., Strangers on a Plane: Context-Dependent Willingness to
Divulge Sensitive Information, 37 J. CONSUMER RES. 858, 858-59 (2011).
3 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 188-93 (2008) (noting
multiple examples of mandatory notice); Paula J. Dalley, The Use and Misuse of Disclo-
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dure to financial regulation.4 Although "ignorance of the law is no
defense,"5 there is a sense in which notice underpins law's basic legiti-
macy-as alluded to by Lon Fuller's inclusion of notice in law's "inter-
nal morality"6  or Friedrich von Hayek's distinction between
arbitrariness and the rule of law.7
In the context of digital privacy, notice is among the only affirma-
tive obligations websites face. California law and federally-recognized
best practices require that a company offering an online service link
to a privacy policy. 8 The basic mechanism behind the requirement is
that consumers read and compare privacy policies in order to decide
what services to use and otherwise exercise choices with respect to
their information.9 These decisions are to police the market by
rewarding good practices and penalizing bad ones.10
Officials select notice in part because they fear the effect of so-
called "command-and-control" regulations on innovation and compe-
sure as a Regulatory System, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (2007) ("There are doz-
ens, possibly hundreds, of regulatory schemes that use disclosure in whole or in part
to accomplish their purposes."); William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Dis-
closure Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1707-08 (1999)
("Enthusiasm for mandatory disclosure laws is reaching fever pitch. Virtually, every
bill under consideration by Congress to regulate managed care devotes major por-
tions to information disclosure and dissemination.").
4 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure,
159 U. PA. L. REv. 647, 658-64 (2011) (listing several dozen instances of mandatory
disclosure, including within the contexts of criminal procedure, medicine, contract,
financial transactions, and insurance); see also THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at
188-93 (listing others).
5 See United States v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971)
("The principle that ignorance of the law is no defense applies whether the law be a
statute or a duly promulgated and published regulation."); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v.
Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 68 (1910) ("[I]nnocence cannot be asserted of an action
which violates existing law, and ignorance of the law will not excuse."). But see Lam-
bert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 229 (1957) (requiring probability of knowledge of
obscure city ordinance).
6 See LON L. FULLER, THi MORALITY OF LAw 153 (rev. ed. 1969).
7 See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (1944) ("[G]overnment in
all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand-rules which make
it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers
in given circumstances and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of this
knowledge.").
8 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575-22577 (West 2008).
9 Fred H. Cate, The Failure ofFair Information Practice Principles, in CONSUMER PRO-
TECTION IN THE AGE OF 'INFORMATION EcoNoMv' 341, 341 (Jane K. Winn ed., 2006).
10 See Matthew A. Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of Mandatory Disclo-
sure: Socio-Economics and the Quest for Truth in Lending, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. PoL'v
199, 242 (2005) (discussing disclosure in another context).
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tition," a concern that appears particularly salient when it comes to
digital technology.12 Thus, for instance, a ban on storing Internet
search queries in the name of privacy may interfere with the develop-
ment of useful services that rely on long-term searching trends.' 3 Offi-
cials also perceive notice to be cheaper, easier to enforce, and more
politically palatable than restrictions on the flow of data.' 4 And they
recognize that consumer preferences are heterogeneous, such that
setting a floor for privacy in advance may prove difficult or arbitrary.
Mandatory notice is understandably popular, but it is also contro-
versial. Many criticize privacy notice as ineffective or worse.15 These
skeptics point out that few consumers read privacy policies and fewer
understand them, and hence never become informed decision mak-
ers capable of protecting themselves or policing the market.' 6 If any-
thing, consumers see the legally required words "privacy policy" and
believe it means that the company has a "policy of privacy" and the
consumer need not concern herself.17 Some skeptics call for the
11 See Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 DUKE L.J. 607, 627 (critiqu-
ing the use of "rigid, highly bureaucratized 'command-and-control' regulation").
12 See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on
the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REv. 247, 303 (2011) ("The shortcomings of command-and-
control governance ... are well recognized."); Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner
Environment: What Privacy Regulation Can Learn from Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REv.
1, 9, 10-11, 33-37 (2006) (arguing that "command-and-control type regulations
would not be a good fit for the highly diverse and dynamic digital economy" due to
the expense and threat to innovation); see also Ian Ayres & Matthew Funk, Marketing
Privacy, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 106 (2003) (comparing rules to a market approach in
the context of telemarketing).
13 See Nicklas Lundblad & Betsy Masiello, Opt-in Dystopias, 7 SCRIPTED 156, 156,
161-62 (2010) (arguing that a requirement for users to opt-in to analysis of their
search terms would make socially beneficial technologies such as Google Flu Trends
less useful); see also IAN AYERS &JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 4 (1992)
(discussing the effect regulation can have on firm innovation).
14 See infra notes 115-125 and accompanying text.
15 See, e.g., Cate, supra note 9; Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The
Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/SJ. L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. Soc'Y 543, 544, 564 (2008);
Solon Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, On Notice: The Trouble with Notice and Con-
sent Order 1-6 (Oct. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.nyu.
edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/EDSIIOnNotice.pdf (scrutinizing the use of
"notice and consent" to address privacy concerns in online behavioral advertising).
16 See infra notes 134-38; see also Edwards, supra note 10, at 204 ("Put bluntly,
many critics simply do not think that disclosure works.").
17 See CHRISJAY HOOFNAGLE &JENNIFER KING, RESEARCH REPORT 2 (2008), availa-
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1262130 (noting that a majority of Californian adults
believe that the mere existence of a privacy policy translates into specific limitations
on what a company may collect or disclose).
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abandonment of privacy notice entirely in favor of the same substan-
tive regulation on conduct the notice requirement sought to avoid.' 8
The result has been a standstill in online privacy law: regulators
refuse to abandon notice as their primary regulatory mechanism
despite growing evidence that existing consumer notices are ineffec-
tive.19 Identifying a new generation of notice that may not be suscep-
tible to the withering critiques commonly levied at traditional notice
could lead to an important new regulatory tool in privacy and else-
where. To be clear, this Article does not recommend any particular
solution for the issue of online privacy. Rather, it argues against an
extreme skepticism of mandatory notice-a highly popular but much
maligned regulatory strategy-by questioning whether critics or pro-
ponents of notice have identified and tested all of the available notice
strategies.
In Part I, the Article examines the promise of radical new forms
of experiential or visceral notice based in contemporary design psy-
chology. Visceral notice differs from traditional notice in that it does
not necessarily rely on describing practices in language or symbols.
Rather, it leverages a consumer's very experience of a product or ser-
vice to warn or inform. This Part also compares and contrasts visceral
notice to other regulator strategies that seek to "nudge" or influence
consumer or citizen behavior. 20
Part II discusses why the further exploration of visceral notice
and other notice innovation is warranted. The regulatory alternatives
to notice are poor. Several scholars have described the danger of sub-
stantive restrictions on conduct, particularly in a dynamic context
such as the Internet-among the reasons that notice gets selected in
the first place.2' It may be that visceral notice is not susceptible to
many of the criticisms of traditional notice. Repeated experience
does not necessarily wear out in the same way as repeated messages,
18 See Cate, supra note 9, at 343 (proposing "substantive restrictions on data
processing designed to prevent specific harms"); Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note
15 (manuscript at 6) (favoring "substantive direct regulation" of online ad targeting);
see also Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote:
Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 139, 147
(2006) (calling for regulators to "lay aside the gospel of disclosure in favor of more
substantive laws that regulate conduct directly").
19 See, e.g., Consumer Online Privacy: Hearing Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science &
Transportation, 111th Cong. 34 (2010) (statement of Jonathan D. Leibowitz, Chair-
man, FTC) (stating that "the most important thing is clear notice to consumers").
20 The word "nudge" is a reference to the title of Richard Thaler and Cass Sun-
stein's book defending various techniques of libertarian paternalism. See THALER &
SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 4-8 (defining both nudges and libertarian paternalism).
21 See supra note 12.
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for instance.22 If this is right, we should know about it, as it would
mean that calls to abandon notice in favor of substantive regulation
are premature.
Part III explores potential challenges to visceral notice-for
instance, from the First Amendment-and lays out some thoughts on
the best regulatory context for requiring or incentivizing visceral
notice. In particular, this Part highlights the potential of safe harbors
and goal-based rules, i.e., rules that look to the outcome of a notice
strategy rather than dictate precisely how notice must be delivered. It
also highlights the advantages of staying true to the essential premise
of notice as a regulatory mechanism: conveying useful information.
This Article uses online privacy as a case study for several reasons.
First, notice is among the only affirmative obligations that companies
face with respect to privacy-online privacy is a quintessential notice
regime.23 Second, the Internet is a context in which notice is widely
understood to have failed, but where the nature of digital services
means that viable regulatory alternatives are few and poor.24 Finally,
the fact that websites are entirely designed environments furnishes
unique opportunities for the sorts of untraditional interventions
explored in Part I of the Article.
Yet the insights of this Article are not limited to privacy. Similar
dynamics play out in many other substantive areas.25 Any lessons this
Article yields might be applied much more broadly.
I. EXPERIENCE: AN EMERGING NOTICE STRATEGY
Notice is a popular regulatory strategy. In the context of online
privacy, providing notice is among the only obligations companies
22 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 90-91 (discussing "wear out" in the
context of computer software); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through
Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 212 (2006) (describing "wear out" as the phenomenon
"in which consumers learn to tune out message [sic] that are repeated too often"); see
also Eric Goldman, A Coasean Analysis of Marketing, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 1151, 1180
(describing the escalating cycle of louder and louder disclosure).
23 See infra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 114-25 and accompanying text.
25 See generally Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic Theory ofDisclosure Regulation and
Other Costs ofDisclosure, 58 ALA. L. REv. 473 (2007) (describing securities regulation);
Ripken, supra note 18 (describing predatory lending); Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure's
Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH. L. REV. 1109 (describing subprime
lending); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity,
2004 U. ILL. L. REv. 1 (describing securities regulation); Charles D. Weisselberg,
Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REv. 1519 (2008) (describing Miranda warnings);
Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory
Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REv. 707 (2006) (describing predatory lending).
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face. California law requires any company that collects personally
identifiable information from California citizens-which is most
Internet companies in the United States-to have a privacy policy.2 6
This policy must contain a basic description of the information the
company collects, how it is used, with whom it is shared, and how it is
secured.27 The company must link to the privacy policy from any
page from which it collects personal information. The link must be
"conspicuous" and contain the word "privacy."28
The Federal Trade Commission is the agency primarily responsi-
ble for enforcing consumer privacy online. Its animating statute, the
FTC Act, provides the Commission with a mandate to investigate and
pursue claims of unfair or deceptive practice. 29 The FTC is guided by
a set of "fair information practice principles" in applying the FTC Act
to online privacy.30 These principles include notice/awareness,
choice/consent, access/participation, and integrity/security.31
In practice, the Commission privileges the principle of notice to
the practical exclusion of the others. Agency materials refer to notice
as "[t]he most fundamental principle."32 A review of the FTC's
enforcement pattern over the past decade-from the Microsoft Pass-
port consent order to the recent Sears proceeding-reveals that the
Commission seldom moves forward with an enforcement proceeding
unless a company has violated the notice/awareness principle, pro-
vided clearly inadequate security, or some combination thereof.33
As the Commission has acknowledged, consumers face a number
of obstacles to the gainful use of privacy policies. Most choose not to
read them, for instance, and those that do find them unclear and
excessively long.34 Scholars in multiple disciplines have explored
26 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (West 2008).
27 See id.
28 See id.
29 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006 & Supp. IV
2010).
30 Fair Information Practice Principles, FED. TRADE COMM'N, http://www.ftc.gov/
reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm (last visited Jan. 12, 2012).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 See Marcia Hofmann, Federal Trade Commission Enforcement of Privacy, in PROS-
KAUER ON PRIVACY § 4:1 (Christopher Wolf ed., 2008) (reviewing FTC enforcement of
online privacy through 2010); see also Cate, supra note 9, at 355-56 ("What is immedi-
ately striking about the FTC's approach is not only its exclusion of most FIPPS, but
also its transformation of collection limitation, purpose specification, use limitation,
and transparency into mere notice and consent.").
34 See Cate, supra note 9, at 359; SARAH GORDON, SYMANTEc SECURITY RESPONSE,
PRIVACY 12 (2003), available at http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/pri-
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shortening privacy policies or otherwise changing their format to
reduce the burden on consumers. This might involve converting
"legalese" to plainer language,3 5 "layering" notice, 3 6 placing the infor-
mation in a table,37 or otherwise standardizing disclosure.38 Studies
show only marginal improvement in consumer understanding where
privacy policies get expressed as tables, icons, or labels, assuming the
consumer even reads them.39
This Article focuses on emerging techniques of notice that, repre-
senting something of a radical departure from traditional notice, have
gone largely unexplored to date. Acknowledging the limitations of
the written word, icon, or picture, this Part looks to the potential of
contemporary design psychology to create a new generation of notice.
The notice described below differs from privacy policies-and,
indeed, traditional notice generally-in that it does not rely exclu-
sively on language or its symbolic equivalent. Rather, it is "visceral," in
the sense of changing the consumers understanding by leveraging the
very experience of a product or service. 40
The first section offers three categories of visceral notice and
gives examples. The categories include using a familiarity with one
technology or context to warn or inform about another; using certain
common psychological reactions to design to change a consumer's
vacy.attitudes.behaviors.pdf; Miriam J. Metzger, Effects of Site, Vendor, and Consumer
Characteristics on Web Site Trust and Disclosure, 33 CoMM. REs. 155, 159, 168-69 (2006);
see also Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 4, at 671 (readership of boilerplate lan-
guage "is effectively zero").
35 See Mike Yang, Trimming Our Pivacy Policies, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Sept. 3,
2010, 9:00 AM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/09/trimming-our-privacy-pol-
icies.html (explaining Google's decision to redraft elements of its privacy policy).
36 See CTR. FOR INFO. POLICY LEADERSHIP, HUNTON & WILLIAMS LLP, TEN STEPS To
DEVELOP A MULTILAYERED PRIVACY NOTICE 1 (2007).
37 See generally ALAN LEVY & MANoJ HASTAK, CONSUMER COMPREHENSION OF FINAN-
CIAL PRIVACY NOTICES (2008) (report prepared for seven federal agencies suggesting
the use of tables in financial privacy disclosure).
38 Lauren Willis argues for, inter alia, a simplified "Loan Price Tag" in the lending
context. See Willis, supra note 25, at 820-21. Corey Ciocchetti urges for nutrition
labels filled with fair information practices. See Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Future of Pri-
vacy Policies: A Privacy Nutrition Label Filled with Fair Information Practices, 26J. MARSHALL
J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1 (2008); see also PATRICK GAGE KELLEY ET AL., CARNEGIE MEL-
LON UNIv., STANDARDIZING PRIVACY NOTICES (2010), available at http://repository.
cmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=cylab (conducting an online
study of the nutrition label approach).
39 See generally KELLEY ET AL., supra note 38 (assessing the efficacy of labels); LEVY
& HASTAK, supra note 37 (assessing the use of tables).
40 Technically "viscera" refer to the internal organs. The term is meant here met-
aphorically to distinguish between notice that draws from experience and notice that
requires conscious processing by the brain.
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mental model 41 of a product or service; and "showing" consumers
instead of "telling" them, i.e., demonstrating the result of company
practices for the specific consumer, rather than describing the prac-
tices themselves. Notice as experience is unfamiliar territory, residing
at the intersection of conscious and unconscious information process-
ing. The second section briefly compares and contrasts visceral notice
to techniques intended to convey information with symbols or influ-
ence behavior.
A. Visceral Notice
Language is not the only means to convey information. Nor is it
always the most efficient. A simple example is pain. 4 2 You stub your
toe. Seized by pain, you ask: "Why do I have to feel this? Why can't
my body simply alert me that I've hurt myself?" Such a system, while
superficially attractive, would be insupportably inefficient. Moment to
moment, pain, pressure, and other physical sensations communicate a
great deal of information (location, severity, type, duration, etc.) with-
out recourse to language. Imagine the alternative: a dizzying concate-
nation of written, symbolic, or aural messages we would quickly tune
out.
The principle that we can experience information can be, and in
cases has been, pressed into the service of notice. Like language,
experience has the capability of changing our mental models-that is,
our understandings and assumptions about a given product, environ-
ment, or system.43 You can add yet another traffic sign to say "road
narrows," or you can accentuate the roadway with rumble strips. You
can post signs throughout a city reminding pedestrians that electric
cars are silent, or you can require car manufacturers to introduce an
engine sound.4 4 You can write a lengthy privacy policy that few will
read, or you can design the website in a way that places the user on
41 A "mental model" is the set of expectations, assumptions, and knowledge indi-
viduals bring to their experiences of technology and the world. See DONALD A. NOR-
MAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVERYDAY THINGS 17 (1988); Abhay Sukumaran & Clifford
Nass, The Role of Social Observation in Understanding Novel Technologies, CHI 2009 1, 1
("This literature loosely characterizes mental models as cognitive tools that allow
users to make sense of unfamiliar technologies and predict how a system will respond
to their actions."). One common misperception is that well-designed products do not
need warnings. In a sense, well-designed products are warnings. Cf DONLAD A. NOR-
MAN, THE DESIGN OF FUTURE THINGS 135 (2007) (discussing "self-explaining" objects).
42 Other examples include a game one learns by playing or a language one learns
by speaking.
43 See supra note 42 (defining "mental model").
44 See infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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guard at the moment of collection or demonstrates to the consumer
how their data is actually being used in practice.
What follows is an examination of possible ways to deliver visceral
notice. The list is meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive. Presumably
there are other ways to leverage a consumer's experience with a prod-
uct or service to deliver a kind of actionable information-Part II
explores why it might be profitable to identify and thoroughly test
them.
1. Familiarity as Warning
Often, what we mean by "intuitive" is actually "familiar." We
experience a particular set of technologies and acclimate-that is,
begin to expect certain behaviors and interactions. One example is
the hyperlink: when we come across text on a website that is under-
lined and a different color from the rest of the text, we know that
clicking on it with a cursor will lead somewhere else on the Internet.
This familiarity breeds a kind of opportunity. Designers can and
do use it to create more accurate mental models in consumers of new
technology. 45 Consider three interventions based on the principle of
familiarity, the latter two of which are regulatory in nature. Each
intervention leverages the individual's familiarity with a previous tech-
nology to realign expectations with reality-a function often reserved
for written notices, owner manuals, or other forms of
communications.
The first example involves cell phones and the elderly. Older
consumers did not grow up with cell phones and can have trouble
using them.46 Many commercially available cell phones come with an
owner's manual that explains in detail how the phone works. Presum-
ably this is not enough, however, for the uninitiated: not all consum-
ers, elderly or otherwise, will read or understand these instructions.4 7
Even if they do, it will take time and effort to get up to speed on a new
technology. 48 Another alternative is to eat up the consumer and pro-
45 Cf NORMAN, supra note 41, at 150 (discussing the reintroduction of "natural
signals" to new contexts).
46 See jesse James Garrett, A Cell Phone for Baby Boomers, BUSINESSWEEK, (May 29,
2007), http://www.businessweek.com/innovate/content/may2007/id200 70529_6449
80.htm.
47 See Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41
UCLA L. REv. 1193, 1215-20 (1994) (describing various explanations for consumers'
failure to read).
48 See id. at 1215-20 (discussing competing demands for attention in the context
of good warning in product liability).
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vider's time with phone calls to customer service. This is a costly com-
munication with no guarantee of success.
Faced with this dilemma, the handset giant Samsung intervened
through design. Samsung created the "Jitterbug," a skeumorphic cell
phone that mimics traditional phones in almost every respect, down
to the dial tone.49 The dial tone, though unnecessary to the opera-
tion of the cell phone, signals to the elderly user that he or she may
proceed with the call. The Jitterbug's design makes it possible for
seniors to begin using cell phones without recourse to a lengthy man-
ual or conversation.50
This basic technique can be-and has been-used as a substitute
for verbal or symbolic warning. Regulators in the United States and
Europe became concerned that electric or hybrid vehicles do not emit
an engine noise. There is evidence that the absence of such noise
leads to more pedestrian collisions .' Rather than blanketing the side-
walks with signs warning pedestrians that some cars are now silent,
these regulators investigated another expedient: requiring fake
engine noises that change depending on the distance of the car as a
natural warning embedded in the pedestrian's experience.52
Consider another example involving digital cameras and privacy.
Analog cameras make a click and, often, emit a flash when taking a
49 See Garrett, supra note 46.
50 See id. Apple also designed its popular iPad book reader to respond to the
motion of flipping the page. See iBooks: A Novel Way to Buy and Read Books, APPLE.COM,
http://www.apple.com/ipad/built-in-apps/ibooks.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2012).
Yet another example is "Slurp," a "tangible interface for manipulating abstract infor-
mation as if it were water. Taking the form of an eyedropper, Slurp can extract (slurp
up) and inject (squirt out) pointers to digital objects." Jamie Zigelbaum, Slurp, MIT
MEDIC LAB, http://zig.media.mit.edu/Work/Slurp (last visited Jan. 12, 2012).
51 A 2009 study undertaken by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion found that low speed collisions with pedestrians were "significantly higher" with
hybrids and electrical cars than gas ones. U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., INCIDENCE OF PEDES-
TRIAN AND BICYCLIST CRASHES BY HYBRID ELECTRIC PASSENGER VEHICLES 5-6 (2006),
available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/811204.pdf; see also EUROPEAN
COMM'N, PROGRESS DURING 2009 AT THE UN ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE
(UNECE) 8-9 (2010), available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/automo-
tive/files/unece/sec-2010-0631_.en.pdf ("The Commission services are also aware of
the possible safety risks if 'quiet' vehicles like hybrids or electric vehicles are not ade-
quately noticed by pedestrians or other vulnerable road users."); European Comm'n,
Clean and Energy-Efficient Vehicles: European Strategy for the Uptake of Green Vehicles,
EUROPA 8 (Apr. 28, 2010), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?refer-
ence=MEMO/10/153&format-HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=fr (not-
ing "potential risks due to the quietness of electric vehicles").
52 See, e.g., Pedestrian Safety Enhancement Act of 2008, H.R. 5734, 110th Cong.
§ 5 (2008) (proposing requirement to address the relative quiet of electric and hybrid
cars).
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picture. Digital cameras lack a shutter and, accordingly, are as a
default silent. Many require very little light and hence do not use
flash as often. Digital cameras tend to be smaller than analog cameras
and come in a wider variety of shapes and sizes. Importantly, digital
cameras can be built into devices with other common uses unrelated
to capturing an image-most notably, cell phones.
This change creates a new opportunity for surreptitious photog-
raphy, raising a privacy concern analogous to that discussed over a
hundred years ago by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in The Right
to Pivacy.53 The subject no longer knows she is being photographed.
One way to address this issue is to penalize taking a photo from a cell
phone or other digital camera without consent. This imposes a cost
on both the photographer and the subject. Another is to post warn-
ings throughout public places. Lawmakers in Japan and the United
States instead proposed requiring that digital cell phone cameras rein-
troduce the shutter sound of sufficient volume to place the subject of
a photo on notice that a picture was being taken. 54
In these and other examples, a company or lawmaker has recog-
nized that the previous state of a given technology affords the means
to realign expectations with reality. By hearing the clicking sound
issuing from the camera, the subject instantaneously realizes that she
is in the presence of a recording technology. She is placed in the
same position as before the problem arose.
In principle, the design of products to leverage a consumer's
familiarity with a previous technology could be treated by officials and
the law as fungible with more traditional warnings. The goal is basi-
cally the same: to alert one or more individuals to a specific danger
within a particular context. There may be a difference in practice; it
may be hard to determine whether the warnings were "good" in the
53 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAR-v. L. REv.
193, 195 (1890) (opening their famous essay with a concern over the privacy ramifica-
tions of "[r]ecent inventions and business methods" such as "instantaneous
photograph[y]").
54 In the 111th Congress, a bill was proposed that would have required cell
phones to make an audible shutter sound. See Camera Predator Alert Act of 2009,
H.R. 414, 111th Cong. (2009). Another example comes from Microsoft Research. To
address the problem of computer cameras and microphones surreptitiously recording
user information, the team built a "sensor-access widget" that "provides an animated
representation of the personal data being collected by its corresponding sensor, call-
ing attention to the application's attempt to collect the data." See JON HOWELL &
STUART SCHECHTER, MICROSOFT RESEARCH, WHAT YOU SEE Is WHAT YOU GET 1 (2010),
available at http://research.microsoft.com/pubs/131132/devices-camera-ready.pdf.
The researchers choose "virtual blinds" because of users' familiarity with pulling down
blinds for greater privacy. See id.
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Comment j sense, for instance.55 But the law should not necessarily
see a distinction between the essential mechanisms of experience and
words where the outcome-a change to the consumer's mental
model-is the same.
2. Psychological Response as Notice
In addition to bringing a set of intuitions to new technologies or
contexts, people share psychological responses to certain design ele-
ments or characteristics. These common reactions have, on some
accounts, a biological or evolutionary basis.56 In any case, there is
extensive evidence that test subjects react in specific, predictable ways
to certain kinds of visual and audio cues irrespective of their underly-
ing familiarity with technology.5 7 Companies and regulators can lev-
erage these techniques to advance policy goals, including better
consumer or citizen understanding.
Consider the way people react to social technology-that is, inter-
faces that feature voices, eyes, or other anthropomorphic qualities. It
turns out we are predisposed to react to anthropomorphic design as
though a person was really there.5 8 We know intellectually that what
we are seeing is not a real person, but for many purposes our brains
are largely incapable of shutting off certain psychological reactions to
the perceived presence of another.59
Among these reactions is the feeling of being observed and evalu-
ated. In one study, people paid more often for coffee on the honor
system when a picture of a pair of eyes was present.60 In another,
people skipped sensitive questions on an online questionnaire and
engaged in more self-promotion when the interface appeared like a
55 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS: PRODUcT LIABILITY § 402A (1965); see also
Latin, supra note 47, passim (discussing how the laws should treat "good" warnings).
56 See, e.g., CLIFFORD NASs & Scorr BRAVE, WIRED FOR SPEECH 3 (2005) ("[O]ver
the course of 200,000 years of evolution, humans have become voice-activated with
brains that are wired to equate voice with people and to act quickly on that identifica-
tion . ... In fact, humans use the same parts of the brain to interact with [machines as
they do to interact with] humans."); BYRON REEVES & CLIFFORD NASs, THE MEDIA
EQUATION 12 (1996) ("The human brain evolved in a world in which only humans
exhibited rich social behaviors, and a world in which all perceived objects were real
physical objects").
57 See REEVES & NAss, supra note 56, at 252 (observing no difference in the effect
of anthropomorphism on trained technologists).
58 See NASs & BRAVE, supra note 56, at 4; REEVES & NASs, supra note 56, at 4.
59 See NASS & BRAVE, supra note 56, at 4; REEVES & NAss, supra note 56, at 4.
60 See Melissa Bateson et al., Cues of Being Watched Enhance Cooperation in a Real-
World Setting, 2 BIOLOcY LETTERS, 412, 412 (2006).
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person.6 ' In each case, the researchers concluded that the changes to
behavior resulted from a feeling of being observed-correct or not.6 2
Research shows a similar effect where users are reminded of them-
selves, for instance, through presentation of their image in a mirror.6 3
The same turns out to be true of formal, as opposed to casual,
websites or other interfaces. Researchers at Carnegie Mellon experi-
mented with how interface formality might interact with user response
to an online personal survey.64 The casual format of the survey used
vivid colors (red, yellow) and began with the header "How BAD R
U???" and an emoticon devil. The formal format used more subdued
colors (blue, black), a somber title, and an official-looking seal.65 The
study found that subjects responded to personal questions more hon-
estly where the interface was casual than in the control or formal
condition.66
Again, we can imagine using this knowledge of the impact of
design on psychology to furnish a kind of notice. For example, one of
the central problems of online privacy is that people are routinely
being tracked by a variety of companies and other parties, but do not
realize that they are.6 7 The introduction of an anthropomorphic cue
or a similar design element could drive home the fact of tracking in a
way that privacy policies cannot.
Introducing visceral notice here might have two kinds of effects.
The first is to make consumers aware of tracking by third-party adver-
61 Lee Sproull et al., WAhen the Interface is a Face, 11 HUM.-COMPUTER INTERACTION
97, 112-16 (1996); see also Edwards, supra note 10, at 204 ("Put bluntly, many critics
simply do not think that disclosure works.").
62 See, e.g., Raoul Rickenberg & Byron Reeves, The Effects of Animated Characters on
Anxiety, Task Performance, and Evaluations of User Interfaces, 2 CHI LErrERS 49, 55
(2000). Perhaps paradoxically, this study found that social interfaces increase user
trust-often cited as a key component of e-commerce. See id. Thus, the subjects of a
study that used animated characters to create the appearance that the individual was
being monitored actually rated the website higher on trust than subjects where the
character was absent. See id.
63 See, e.g., Charles S. Carver & Michael F. Scheier, Self-Focusing Effects of Disposi-
tional Self-Consciousness, Mirror Presence, and Audience Presence, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 324, 328 (1978) (noting that in a sentence completion study, the tendency
to make self-focused sentence completions was greater when a mirror was placed in
front of the subjects).
64 SeeJohn et al., supra note 2, at 858-59.
65 See id. at 863.
66 See id.
67 See Editorial, Enter Search Term Here, Forever, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2006, at A16
("When people search the Internet in their homes, it feels like a private activity."). See
generally Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Infor-
mation Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1393 (2001) (discussing the dangers of tracking).
20121 1039)
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
tisers. Should they experience this tracking as invasive or uncomforta-
ble, they might stop frequenting websites where tracking is
particularly heavy. Imagine, for instance, if each advertising network
on the Internet had an avatar that ran onto the bottom of the screen
to denote the fact that the network was following the user. Users
could click on the avatar to opt out of tracking (or to hide the avatar if
they find it annoying). This design intervention would convey the fact
of tracking in a far more salient way than lines in a privacy policy.
The second kind of effect is to place consumers on alert that the
information they supply might be seen by others. Thus, in certain
sensitive collection environments, regulators could impose a require-
ment that data collection forms achieve a sufficient degree of formal-
ity to place the consumer on their guard. Today, design incentives
seem somehow to be the opposite. Children's websites tend to be the
most casual on all the Internet,68 for instance, despite that lawmakers
are concerned enough specifically with youth privacy to pass a law
requiring or encouraging enhanced notice for websites aimed at those
under the age of thirteen.6 9
These methods have application beyond privacy as well. Con-
sider the context of website comment etiquette and cyberbullying.
One of the central problems of online etiquette appears to be that
children and other users do not experience their communications as
face-to-face conversations with an attendant set of expectations and
mores.70 This perception can lead to anti-social conduct, whether or
not coupled with the quasi-anonymity of a username. 1 Websites
attempt to police against such discourtesy through written notice-
generally, terms of service or community guidelines that few take the
time to read-coupled with selective enforcement of these terms.
68 They are at the same time some of the most aggressive. Jeff Sovern cites to a
study by the Federal Trade Commission as evidence of some of the tactics directed at
collecting information from children, including invitations to sign guest books and to
sign up for pen-pal programs. Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, Or No Options At All:
The Fightfor Control of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1041 (1999). Inter-
estingly, one of the tactics involved the use of fictional characters to pose questions.
See id. An additional advantage of consumer agencies' recognition of the power of
design to affect disclosure is their greater potential to recognize abuses.
69 See Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506
(2006).
70 See Patricia Sdnchez Abril, Private Ordering: A Contractual Approach to Online
Interpersonal Privacy, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689, 699 n.74 (2010) ("Psychologists have
found that face-to-face interaction and physical feedback help navigate the human
brain through social situations, permitting empathy and defining appropriate inter-
personal behavior.").
71 See id. at 699.
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Clever design leveraging psychological responses to technology
could provide an interesting alternative to terms and guidelines. For
instance, the experience of commenting could be made to feel more
like an in-person conversation by graphically representing that a com-
ment to a post is also a comment directed at the author. Or users that
post original content could select the way it is framed on the web-
more formally, for instance-in an effort to signal their target com-
munity and desired level of discussion.7 2
Another example, beyond the digital context entirely, is the
notice requirements of the Clean Water Act.73 The Act requires that,
for certain compounds, water companies file reports with the local
authority indicating their concentration in the water.74 But for
others, such as excess levels of copper or lead, the company must post
signs where consumers will see them.75 We could imagine requiring
that water utilities artificially change the color of the water to warn
about the presence of metal, the way suppliers already add a smell to
gas to warn of leaks.
B. "Showing"
A final technique leverages clever design not to do away with all
words, but to privilege individual experience over generic text. This
method involves eschewing reliance on general terms in favor of tai-
loring notice very specifically to the company's engagement with the
exact individual. The technique bears some affinity to the passing
suggestion by Jon Hanson and Doug Kysar that populations be seg-
mented by demographics to determine what notices they will see.7 6 A
closer parallel is Edward Rubin's argument that notice fails to protect
consumers because it relies on what philosophers call "theoretical"
72 Of course, it follows that most of the worse comments-racist or sexist rants,
for instance-will not disappear merely because of visceral notice. Many presumably
know and intend that their comments will cause harm. The technique is promising
only for low-level discourtesy. It may be prove especially powerful, however, in the
context of cyberbullying, where the bias is less virulent and perpetrators ostensibly
less hardened.
73 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2006 & Supp. Ill 2010).
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence
of Market Manipulation, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1420, 1561-63 (1999).
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knowledge, as opposed to practical knowledge delivered through
interactivity with the consumer.7 7
In the context of "debiasing," that is, using law to combat known
cognitive limitations, Christine Jolls and Cass Sunstein explore the use
of anecdote or concrete instances to overcome optimism bias.78 The
idea is that warning a patient of the numerical risk of breast cancer,
for instance, will not lead to an accurate assessment because people
tend to discount the possibility a given negative event will occur to
them.79 The authors conclude that regulators should consider man-
dating the recitation of a specific negative outcome-perhaps a story
about a hypothetical woman's hospital stay as she battles breast
cancer.80
Technology and clever design create the possibility of tailoring
anecdotes to individual consumers, thereby showing them what is spe-
cifically relevant to them, instead of describing generally what might
be.81 A simple example is a requirement that lenders calculate exactly
how much money a loan will cost a borrower each month and overall,
as well as the exact amount of time it will take to pay off. This practice
is routine in places and, although imperfect, suggests a way to tailor
financial terms to individuals. We can imagine further inputs-for
instance, what will happen to this or that borrower should he miss a
payment or if interest rates change-to dramatize other terms of the
deal on offer.
The online context, where there is a layer of design between the
consumer and the product or service, provides vivid examples. 2 Con-
sider three. Mozilla, the company behind the popular Firefox
Internet browser, invites users to test out new features in Mozilla Labs
using Test Pilot.83 Consistent with standard legal practice, Mozilla
provides a privacy policy and terms of use that explain, generally, what
information Mozilla might collect and how it might use that informa-
tion. About one study, Mozilla says: "We will periodically collect data
77 Edward Rubin, The Internet, Consumer Protection and Practical Knowledge, in CON-
SUMER PROTECTION IN THE AGE OF THE 'INFORMATION EcONOMY' 35, 40-44 (Jane K
Wynn ed., 2006).
78 SeeJolls & Sunstein, supra note 22, at 210.
79 See id.
80 See id.
81 See Rubin, supra note 77, at 52.
82 See id. at 36 (discussing how technology presents new and better opportunities
for tailoring information to individuals); cf LAWRENCE LESSIC, CODE (2006) (discuss-
ing additional opportunities for regulation through "code" in cyberspace).
83 Test Pilot, MOZILLA LABS, https://testpilot.mozillalabs.com/ (last visited Jan 12,
2012).
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on the browser's basic performance for one week . . . ."8 Prior to
transmitting user information from the user's computer to Mozilla's
servers, however, Mozilla also shows users a report of what informa-
tion has actually been collected and asks them to review and approve
it.8 5 Thus, users actually see a specific, relevant instance of collection
and decide to consent on this basis.
One of the first companies to use this basic technique was the
Internet search giant Google, Inc. Google has dozens of services-for
both consumers and advertisers-governed by a complex series of
interrelated policies.8 6 In connection to ad targeting, for instance,
one of two dozen product policies, Google explains:
[T]o serve ads that are relevant and tailored to your interests, we
may use information about your activity on AdSense partner sites or
Google services that use the DoubleClick cookie. Some of these
sites and services also may use non-personally identifying informa-
tion, such as demographic data, to provide relevant advertising.8 7
In addition to this somewhat generic written disclosure, Google
created ancillary tools to help its users understand what data Google
has about them and how it will be used. Thus, for instance, the
Google Dashboard permits consumers to see all in one place what
services store any of their information." Google Ads Preferences per-
mits users to see what guesses Google has made about them in order
to serve relevant ads.8 9 Users may also make changes or delete the
profile entirely.9 0
Other companies have followed Google and Mozilla's lead. The
Internet company Yahoo! now has an "Ad Interest Manager" that
shows even greater detail than that of Google.9 A more recent exam-
ple is Facebook's Interactive Tools, one of which permits users to see
84 Current Test Cases, MOZILLA LABS, https://testpilot.mozillalabs.com/testcases/
(last visited Jan. 12, 2012).
85 See supra note 83.
86 Privacy Center, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/en/privacy/ (last visited
Jan. 12, 2012) (listing services).
87 Privacy Center: Privacy Policy for Google Ads and the Google Display Network,
GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/privacy/ads/privacy-policy.html (last visited Jan.
12, 2012).
88 SeeJudy Shapiro, Google Dashboard Changes Our Thinking About Privacy, AD AGE
DIGITAL (Nov. 10, 2009), http://adage.com/article/digitalnext/digital-privacy-
google-dashboard-thinking/140399/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2012).
89 Ads Preferences: Frequently Asked Questions, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/
ads/preferences/html/faq.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2012).
90 See id.
91 See Yahoo! Prvacy: Ad Interest Manager BETA, YAHOO! http://info.yahoo.com/
privacy/us/yahoo/opt.out/targeting/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2012).
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how their profile looks to those who are not signed in-that is, to
cops, teachers, potential employers, and others that might check up.92
Another permits users to target a pretend ad so that they at least
understand what information Facebook's advertising clients see about
them.93 These tools, while imperfect, show users how their informa-
tion is actually used, as opposed to merely telling them how it might
be used.
We can imagine the use of this technique offline as well. The
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA)94 requires lengthy notices to patients about how a pharmacy,
hospital, or other health system will use their information.95 Individu-
als are supposed to read these documents and sign off on them.96
Imagine that, upon entering a hospital, a patient or her representative
were handed a tablet device tracking her chart and other relevant
information throughout and beyond her stay. If the patient sees
something she does not understand, she can ask (or object) in real-
time and will leave with a better understanding to inform her future
choice of hospitals.
Executed well, showing describes what has actually occurred,
thereby embedding information about the company's practices in the
consumer experience of the produce or service-similar to the way we
might best learn the rules of a game by playing it."
C. Notice or Nudge?
Mandatory notice operates according to a specific mechanism: it
furnishes consumers with information they would not otherwise have
so they can protect themselves and police the market.98 Visceral
notice attempts to create the relevant state of awareness in a sense
directly, without necessarily conveying information with language or
symbols. In this way, visceral notice arguably shares an affinity with
92 See Mike Swift, Facebook Rewriting Privacy Policy, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 9,
2011.
93 See id.
94 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, § 1173, 110 Stat. 1936, 2024-26 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18, 26, 29, & 42 U.S.C.)
95 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.520 (2010).
96 See id.
97 One counterargument is that consumers need to learn the rules of the game
before they play. This is true in an ideal world. Showing improves on the world we have
by helping consumers understand what is presently going on. This permits them to
leave if inclined and at least stop sharing information going forward.
98 See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 4, at 103.
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projects aimed either at conveying information without words, or at
influencing consumers at an unconscious level.
Visceral notice operates, in other words, in a gray area between
symbolic representation and cognitive reflex. Its outer boundaries
touch upon each. Thus, for instance, some forms of visceral notice
feel close to visual semiotics-very roughly, the relationship between
signs and meaning within the context of art, advertising, and other
visual media.99 Visual semiotics, however, is ultimately an exercise in
unpacking messages as conveyed by visible symbols. The content can
be expressed either as an arrangement of shapes, colors, etc. or as an
affirmative statement. 00 A waiter can identify himself as a waiter with
words, or simply stand alongside one's table holding a pencil to an
order pad. The use of formality, in contrast, does not necessarily
embed a specific claim about the world, but rather produces a desired
state-for instance, of alert-that an individual may or may not
achieve upon being informed of the relevant facts.
For precisely this reason, we might wonder whether changing
consumer mental states through familiarity, formality, or some of the
other tactics described actually involves information in any meaning-
ful sense at all. The supporting studies within design psychology men-
tioned in the previous section are commonly organized to measure
subject behavior. Thus, a study will measure the act of charitable giv-
ing,' 0 another the act of paying for coffee.102 Similarly, several studies
measure the act of disclosure, noting that less-or less revealing-dis-
closure occurs in the presence of anthropomorphism or formality. 03
As such, one's instinct might be to place the studies and their
regulatory insights not in the context of notice, with its emphasis on
knowledge and consent, but in that of soft paternalism. Championed
by economist Richard Thaler and others, soft paternalism looks pri-
marily to behavioral economics for ways to "nudge" consumer or citi-
zen behavior in directions thought to be desirable by the official,
including by providing visual or audio "feedback."l0 4 The method is
"libertarian" in the sense that individuals technically have the power
99 See GUNTHER KRESS & THEO vAN LEEUWEN, READING IMAGES 1 (1996). Derek
Kiernan-Johnson made this point.
100 See id. at 1-2.
101 See Vanessa Woods, Pay Up, You Are Being Watched, NEWSCIENTIST, Mar. 18,
2005, at 12 (reporting on study tending to show an increase of charitable giving in the
presence of a robot picture).
102 See Bateson et al., supra note 60, at 412.
103 SeeJohn et al., supra note 2, at 858-59; Sproull et al., supra note 61, at 97-100.
104 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 92-93.
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to do something else but "paternalistic" in the sense that it seeks to
channel a particular outcome. 105
In contrast, the law and scholarship around notice tracks not the
consumer's particular behavior, but rather the consumer's under-
standing of the dangers and options. Officials and courts purport to
take the existence or absence of notice as evidence of what a con-
sumer knew about the product or service. The goal of visceral privacy
notice, then, should be to create awareness of data collection and
other relevant issues and realities, rather than to stop consumers from
disclosing per se. In other words, the goal of notice is not to manipu-
late preferences but to give consumers the information they need to
act upon preferences. 06
In theory, visceral notice should be capable of affecting knowl-
edge in this way. Clever design can indeed leverage psychological pre-
dispositions to change an individual's mental model, or basic
understanding, of a product or situation. A study out of Stanford Uni-
versity, for instance, examined how changing the formality of a photo-
sharing interface changed people's stated expectations about the pur-
pose and norms of the website.107 Subjects had expectations about
how a more formal website should be used that they were able to artic-
ulate to the researchers. 0 s Preliminary results of another recent
study conducted by the author and a human-computer interaction
expert suggest that people not only disclose more on casual websites
than formal ones, they believe that less information is being collected
and retained in the casual condition.109
More study is clearly needed-a case the next Part makes in
detail. Perhaps the relationship between knowledge of data collection
and disclosure behavior is merely correlative, for instance, and not
causal. But rather than aim exclusively at influencing behavior, at
105 See id. at 4.
106 This Article assumes for purposes of discussing the promise of notice as a regu-
latory mechanism that consumers come to the web with preexisting privacy prefer-
ences. It may prove impossible entirely to disentangle consumer preferences from
context.
107 See Abhay Sukumaran & Clifford Nass, Socially Cued Mental Models, CHI 2010, at
3379, 3380, 3384 (2010), available at http://delivery.acm.org/10.1145/1760000/1753
988/p3379-sukumaranpdip=129.74.89.63&acc=ACTIVE%20SERVICE&CFID=6221
5519&CYTOKEN=35129007& acm.=1326674814_7ef9f20daa483eb350d837ecca72
fc43.
108 See id.
109 Victoria Groom & M. Ryan Calo, Reversing the Privacy Paradox: An Experimental
Study 28 (Stanford Law Sch. Ctr. for Internet & Soc'y, Working Paper, 2011 (on file
with author) (experimental study on the efficacy of various techniques of nonlinguis-
tic notice on consumer privacy expectations).
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least some interventions that leverage our psychological response to
design appear to be taking an explanatory short cut. Consumers
hopefully end up in a place similar to where they would have been
had they read a warning or policy. They then take the action most
appropriate to that understanding. If so, it follows that these and
other hardwired responses to design could be pressed into the service
of a new form of notice that differs from attempts solely to move
behavior.
II. WHY EXPLORE VISCERAL NOTICE
Part I canvasses mechanisms for delivering notice that rely on
consumer experience rather than entirely on words or symbols. This
Part discusses why further exploration of the concept of experience as
notice is worthwhile. It begins by briefly discussing why notice is so
often selected by regulators in the first place. To paraphrase Winston
Churchill on democracy, notice is the worst regulatory mechanism,
except for all of the alternatives.' 10 Most substitutes for notice are
perceived to be invasive, ineffective, expensive, or arbitrary. Getting
notice right may be a last best chance in at least this regulatory
context.
Experience as notice is exciting in that it may not be susceptible
to the common criticisms levied at traditional notice. In the many
criticisms of notice within and beyond privacy, the same critiques tend
to recur. There are practical reasons why people never see privacy
policies or receive other notices. There are differences in our ability
to process information. And we share certain cognitive limitations
that get in the way of digesting or acting upon warnings, terms, and
other notices. There is reason to believe that these criticisms will not
apply with equal force to experience, undercutting the case against a
uniquely popular regulatory mechanism.
A. Why Notice?
There is no shortage of literature cataloguing the erosion of per-
sonal privacy due to the Internet and other contemporary technol-
ogy."' Yet Internet privacy has proven a difficult area to regulate.
Consumers benefit from the nonexistent or low price point of many
110 Churchill supposedly made this remark in 1947 in the House of Commons. See
444 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (1947) 206-07.
111 See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON (2004) (aiming to rethink
longstanding notions of privacy to grapple with living in the new Information Age); A.
Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1461, 1468 (2000) (discuss-
ing privacy-destroying technologies); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89
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Internet services and from the greater personalization and variety of
online services, all of which depend on data. 1 1 2 Lawmakers and offi-
cials in the United States have refrained from heavy-handed restric-
tions on the flow of information out of a fear of stifling innovation-a
fear shared by academics.'" 3 Yet alternative methods of protecting
consumers have not been seen as effective. Attempts to harness pri-
vate certification of privacy and safety, for instance, have faced clear
limitations.1 14
Notice appears to have certain advantages over other regulatory
mechanisms. Regulators, who face limited resources and enforce-
ment bandwidth, perceive notice as relatively cheap to implement and
easy to enforce.115 Internet business models can be as odd and as
varied as airport vehicles. Rather than spend the resources to discover
and assess each model, those that oversee a notice regime merely have
to verify that the company has described its practices and, in the event
of conflict, determine whether the description is accurate as to that
company.
Regulators worry about the effects of overregulation on legiti-
mate business interests. Notice seeks to preserve the conditions for
innovation and competition, which an excess of rigid restrictions is
YALE L.J. 421, 465 (1980) (attempting to vindicate the way most people think about
privacy issues in the new era).
112 See INTERNET POLICY TAX FORCE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMMERCIAL DATA
PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET ECONOMY 32 (2010) ("We are also mindful
that a hallmark of the digital economy is the wide variety of rapidly evolving products,
services, and content that are often made available free of charge in part through the
use of personal data.").
113 See Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 12, at 303 ("The shortcomings of com-
mand-and-control governance ... are well recognized."); Hirsch, supra note 12, at 9,
10-11, 33-37 (arguing that "command-and-control type regulations would not be a
good fit for the highly diverse and dynamic digital economy" due to the expense and
threat to innovation).
114 One possibility is for third-parties to certify the adequacy of a company's over-
all privacy practices in exchange for compensation. A recent study of a leading seal
provider, however, found that the presence of the seal made certain privacy-invasive
practices more likely. See Benjamin Edelman, Adverse Selection in Online "Trust" Certifica-
tions and Search Results, 10 ELECTRONIC COM. RES. & APPLICATIONS 17, 17-25 (2011).
The FTC also brought an action against a privacy and security seal provider for fraud.
See ETC v. ControlScan, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-00532-JEC (N.D. Ga. 2009), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0723165/100225controlscanstip.pdf (stipulating final
judgment and ordering a permanent injunction and other equitable relief). This is
not to say that there is no role for third-party certification, only that it is not a stand
alone panacea.
115 See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 4, at 682 (observing that notice is
attractive because it "looks cheap" and "looks easy"). But see id. at 735-37 (identifying
hidden costs of notice).
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thought to compromise." 6 This concern appears particularly salient
when it comes to digital technology.117 The Internet industry can
credibly claim that substantive restrictions may impede innovation,
leading to fewer useful services, or else privilege one technology over
another. 18 Thus, for instance, a flat ban on storing Internet search
queries may interfere with the development of socially beneficial tech-
nologies such as Google Flu Trends that rely on long-term searching
patterns.'19 (Of course, the absence of regulation also has the poten-
tial to impede innovation or privilege one technology over
another.120)
Regulators also worry about setting an arbitrary ceiling or floor
for privacy.121 People indeed have different subjective preferences
with respect to privacy and, the view is, those who value privacy little
should be able to exchange their personal information for things
upon which they place a greater value.122 Notice purports to respect
the basic autonomy of the consumer or citizen by arming her with
information and placing the ultimate decision in her hands.'12 The
hope is that informed consumers create a market that rewards compa-
nies for good privacy practices and penalizes them for bad ones.
116 See Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note 12, at 303 ("The shortcomings of com-
mand-and-control governance ... are well recognized."); Sunstein, supra note 11, at
627 (critiquing the use of "rigid, highly bureaucratized 'command-and-control'
regulation").
117 See Hirsch, supra note 12, at 10-11 (arguing that "command-and-control type
regulations would not be a good fit for the highly diverse and dynamic digital econ-
omy" due to the expense and threat to innovation).
118 See AYERs & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 13, at 4.
119 Cf Lundblad & Masiello, supra note 13, at 156, 161-62 (arguing that a require-
ment for users to opt-in to analysis of their search terms would make socially benefi-
cial technologies such as Google Flu Trends less useful). Google Flu Trends was
reportedly used by the Center for Disease Control to allocate resources during the flu
season.
120 See generally BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION
(2010) (arguing, inter alia, that regulation is sometimes necessary to prevent Internet
service providers and other, dominant platforms from exerting an unhealthy control
over the network).
121 See supra note 12 (discussing concerns with substantive restrictions in digital
technology).
122 SeeJames P. Nehf, Shopping for Privacy Online: Consumer Decision Making Strategies
and the Emerging Market for Information Privacy, 2005 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 1,
14-17.
123 See Dalley, supra note 3, at 1093 ("[D] isclosure schemes comport with the pre-
vailing political philosophy in that disclosure preserves individual choice while avoid-
ing direct governmental interference."); Sage, supra note 3, at 1705 (noting the
"growing commitment to patient autonomy and self-determination" in bioethics as
paving the way to mandated disclosure in healthcare).
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Finally, there is the political reality that notice may be more palat-
able to regulated industry.1 2 4 Mandated notice can and does face
opposition, but opposition tends to be less fierce than to top-down
dictates regarding what a company can and cannot do. Regulators,
eager to do something to help consumers, but lacking the political
capital or will to limit or curtail the activities of a given industry, may
opt for notice as a means at least to improve the context of online
privacy for some consumers.12 5
Notice promises to represent, in these respects and others, a rela-
tively attractive option in the context of online privacy. This basic
analysis is not limited to privacy or even the Internet. Scholars discuss-
ing a wide variety of contexts highlight similar reasons that notice is so
singularly popular. And, as alluded to above, it is quite popular. In
their recent article The Failure of Mandatory Disclosure, Omri Ben-
Shahar and Carl Schneider canvas several dozen instances of
mandatory disclosure, including ones within contexts as diverse as
criminal procedure, medicine, contract, financial transactions, and
insurance. 126
B. The Case Against Notice
That regulators select notice so regularly is understandable. But
the case against notice is a strong one. There is a great deal of evi-
dence that few consumers read privacy policies or similar documents,
for instance, and that even fewer understand them. Privacy notice as
deployed in practice likely does not accomplish its avowed goal of
enhancing consumer autonomy or policing the market.127
124 See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 4, at 684 (citing William N. Eskridge,
Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Eco-
nomic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV.
1083, 1096-1102 (1984)).
125 More cynically, we might say that lawmakers would like to appear to have done
something. See id. at 684 ("In short, when lawmakers are besieged, mandated disclo-
sure looks like rescue. . . . Lawmakers can be seen to have acted. . . . Easy alternatives
are few. Disclosure's political utility does much to explain its incessant use and its
irrepressible expansion.").
126 See id. at 658-64 (listing several dozen instances of mandatory disclosure,
including within the contexts of criminal procedure, medicine, contract, financial
transactions, and insurance); see also THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 188-93
(listing others).
127 Indeed, there is evidence that privacy policies can do more harm than good.
Some research suggests that when people see the words "privacy policy," a term that is
required by law, they assume that the company has a "policy of privacy" that imposes
substantive limits on what it can do with consumer data. See HOOFNAGLE & KING,
supra note 17, at 2 (noting that a majority of Californian adults believe that the mere
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Again, the proceeding story is in no way limited to online privacy.
You see many descriptions of particular areas of law where lawmakers
select traditional notice as their regulatory tool, only to confront a
mountain of evidence proving it ineffective or counterproductive.128
Notice can appear to be, in more vivid words, a "Lorelei, luring
lawmakers onto the rocks of regulatory failure."129
1. Practical Hurdles
The best starting point in the case against privacy notices is likely
the obstacles privacy policies face in even reaching their intended
audience. According to legend, the Roman tyrant Caligula acknowl-
edged the need to create and publish the law, "but it was written in a
very small hand, and posted up in a corner, so that no one could
make a copy of it."1so Today's notices are, if not posted in a corner,
not always accessed in practice. Courts have upheld the use of email
for service of process, 13' notwithstanding the danger posed by spam
filters' 32 and the general, "best efforts" architecture of Internet proto-
col. A 1978 federal bankruptcy law still requires that notice of munici-
pal bankruptcy be "published at least once a week for three successive
weeks in at least one newspaper of general circulation" despite the
proliferation of digital information sources.133
The situation is similar with respect to privacy notices: many con-
sumers will throw out mandatory privacy notices they receive in the
mail without reading them.13 4 Online, there is extensive evidence
that few read privacy policies, terms of service, or other documents,
whether or not they are forced to "click through" them on the way to
existence of a privacy policy translates into specific limitations on what a company
may collect or disclose). Privacy policies tend to do the opposite: they are written by
lawyers to be as permissive as possible.
128 See supra note 25 (collecting papers that criticize notice in a variety of
contexts).
129 Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 4, at 681.
130 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 96 (1945) (quoting SUETONIus, THE
TWELVE CAESARS 198 (Alexander Thomson trans., Digireads.com 2007) (121)). I have
Samuel Bray to thank for reminding me of this example.
131 See, e.g., Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir.
2002).
132 See, e.g., Pace vs. Am. Int'l Grp., No. 08 C 945, 2010 WL 4530357, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 1, 2010) (spam filter allegedly filtered out notification of the right and timing
of an appeal).
133 See 11 U.S.C. § 923 (2006).
134 See Cate, supra note 9, at 359 ("[N]otices may never be received. In fact, most
requests for consumer consent never reach the eyes or ears of their intended recipi-
ent."); id. at 359-60 (citing reports).
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content or services. 13 5 In one dramatic example, a videogame com-
pany from the United Kingdom included a provision in its terms of
service that, unless the user opted out, the company would retain
rights to the user's eternal soul. 19 6 Reportedly twelve percent of peo-
ple opted out-an abnormally high number attributable to the cover-
age of the stunt among technology blogs.13 7 Even the sitting Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court admitted that he does not read terms of
service."'
That people might not take the time to read notices makes sense.
Having to read a notice takes the consumer away from the fun or
function of a service. People are busy and face many competing
demands on their time.' 39 It is rational, in the sense of welfare maxi-
mizing, for individuals to ignore many notices. And it is probably
desirable from the viewpoint of society. Researchers at Carnegie Mel-
lon once calculated that it would cost $781 billion in worker produc-
tivity if everyone were to read all of the privacy policies they
encountered online in one year.1 40
2. Limits on Understanding
Even assuming a privacy notice reaches the intended audience,
there are a number of reasons why it still might not have its intended
effect. One reason has to do with differences in understanding and
capability across a wide potential audience. A second concerns the
inherent limitations in our ability to process information and make
decisions on its basis-what Herbert Simon famously labeled our
"bounded rationality" 14 1 and what contemporary behavioral econom-
ics refers to as "cognitive limitations" or "biases."14 2
135 See GORDON, supra note 34, at 12 (only three in sixty-three people in a study
reported reading a privacy policy); Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 4, at 671
(readership of boilerplate language "is effectively zero"); Cate, supra note 9, at 359;
Miriam J. Metzger, Effects of Site, Vendor, and Consumer Characteristics on Web Site Trust
and Disclosure, 33 CoMm. RES. 155, 159, 168-69 (2006).
136 See 7,500 Online Shoppers Unknowingly Sold Their Souls, FoxNEWS.COM (Apr. 15,
2010), http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2010/04/15/online-shoppers-unknowingly-
sold-souls/.
137 See id.
138 See Andrew Malcolm, Top of the Ticket: Chief Justice Roberts on Tiny Type, Los
ANGELES TIMEs (Oct. 20, 2010, 3:24 PM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/washing-
ton/2010/ 10/chiefjustice-John-Roberts-state-of-the-union.html.
139 See Latin, supra note 47, at 1215-20.
140 See McDonald & Cranor, supra note 15, at 544, 564.
141 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN 196 (1957).
142 See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 635 (1999) (arguing that cogni-
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a. Varying Capacities
People vary in their ability to process information. 143 Notices are
often written by specialized professionals for an audience that
includes the very young, the very old, and the thirty million adults of
"below basic" literacy. 144 Privacy policies, for instance, tend to be writ-
ten at a college level; the average reading level of an American is
somewhere between the eighth and ninth grade.1 45 The gap can both
dissuade some populations from reading notices and limit their ability
to comprehend any they do read.
Similarly, American privacy policies are written in English, which
is not everyone's first language. Translations are not always available
and, even where they are, the sense of the content can get lost.146 In
the context of criminal procedure, studies have shown that translated
Miranda warnings often have a substantively different meaning than
the original.'47 Non-native speakers may also be more susceptible to
the "lulling effect" sometimes occasioned by the appearance of legalis-
tic notices and described in the following section.14 8
tive biases make individual decision makers susceptible to manipulation by those able
to influence the context in which decisions are made); Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 22,
at 204 (noting that availability heuristics can produce important biases); W. Kip Vis-
cusi, Individual Rationality, Hazard Warnings, and the Foundations of Tort Law, 48
RUTGERS L. REv. 625, 630 (1996) (noting that in the extreme view, human cognitive
limitations might be so great that it is irrational to rely on hazard warnings at all).
143 See Sage, supra note 3, at 1728 ("Individuals vary widely in their knowledge and
experience, as well as in their capacity to understand disclosed information.").
144 See id. ("This problem is particularly acute in the case of vulnerable subpopula-
tions."); Latin, supra note 47, at 1208 (discussing functional illiteracy and
"[p]redictably [i]nattentive or [ijncompetent [u]ser [g]roups"). According to the
most recent National Assessment of Adult Literacy, fourteen percent of American
adults operate at "below basic" literacy. National Assessment of Adult Literacy:
Demographics, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC., http://nces.ed.gov/naal/kfldemographics.asp
(last visited Jan. 12, 2012).
145 See KELLEY ET AL., supra note 38, at 1 ("Most [privacy] policies are written at a
level that is suitable for consumers with a college-level education."); Mark A. Graber
et al., Reading Level of Privacy Policies on Internet Health Web Sites, 51 J. FAM. PRACT. 642,
642 (2002) (concluding that the average privacy policy for Internet health websites
required two years of college education).
146 See State v. Santiago, 556 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Wis. 1996) (finding "evidence that
the warnings given in Spanish did not reasonably convey the Miranda rights to the
defendant").
147 See Weisselberg, supra note 25, at 1573.
148 See Willis, supra note 25, at 794-95. The lulling effect refers to the belief that
rights exist merely because of the appearance of legalistic language. See id.
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b. Shared Cognative Limitations
We are different from one another, but we also share many inher-
ent cognitive limitations. One of the most common complaints
against notice is that it relies on a false model of human capacity: the
perfectly rational consumer with limitless attention. Herbert Simon
famously described human rationality as "bounded," an insight devel-
oped by the eventual behavioral economics movement. 4 9 Through a
series of experiments and observations, scholars have assembled a
long, well-evidenced list of our shared cognitive limitations, which
operate to hamper the human ability to process notices and other
information.o5 0 Critics routinely, and understandably, refer to cogni-
tive limitations and biases in explaining their skepticism toward
notice.15 '
Information overload is one common and intuitive example.
Simply put, information overload refers to the phenomenon that too
much information will overwhelm the recipient, causing her to skim,
freeze, or pick out information arbitrarily.152 Obviously, this inter-
feres with the basic mechanism behind traditional notice. As Susana
Kim Ripken explains in the context of securities regulation:
When faced with too much data, people have a tendency to become
distracted by less relevant information and to ignore information
that may turn out to be highly relevant. They can handle moderate
amounts of data well, but tend to make inferior decisions when
required to process increasingly more information.' 5 3
Privacy policies are not exactly 10-Ks. But these are long docu-
ments-Facebook's privacy policy reportedly contains more words
(5,830) than the entire United States Constitution.' 5 4 Consumers
have a tendency to skip or skim these documents and are not gener-
ally capable of processing all the information they contain.
149 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 76, at 1423-25; Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 22,
at 199-200.
150 See, e.g., DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL (rev. ed. 2009) (assembling
studies).
151 See supra note 25 (compiling examples).
152 See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 4, at 27-28 (describing the "overload
effect"); Dalley, supra note 3, at 1115-17 (discussing "information overload"); Latin,
supra note 47, at 1211-15, 1293 (discussing "information overload" and describing
"excessive disclosure").
153 See Ripken, supra note 18, at 160-61.
154 See Bianca Bosker, Facebook Privacy Policy Explained: It's Longer than the Constitu-
lion, HUFFINcTON POST (May 25, 2011, 5:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2010/05/12/facebook-privacy-policy-s n_574389.html.
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That our capacity to process information is limited underpins
much skepticism about notice. Information overload isjust one exam-
ple drawn from behavioral economics. Others include anchoring,155
availability and other heuristics,15 6 susceptibility to framing,15 7 and the
influence of self-esteem.' 58 Our divergence from rational decision
making based on cognitive limitations or biases has been repeatedly
summarized elsewhere, including in the context of privacy. 159
C. As Applied to Visceral Notice
The apparent failure of notice in privacy and elsewhere to accom-
plish the goal of protecting the consumer and policing the market has
led to something of a cottage industry around notice skepticism. A
scholar might say that they work in area x and, in that area, mandatory
notice is among the only affirmative obligations companies face.16 0
But notice does not accomplish its avowed goal of protecting consum-
ers or citizens for a variety of well-evidenced reasons having to do with
the obstacles and limits people face in processing information.
Upon making this showing, critics of notice tend to take one of
three directions. Some rest their case there.' 6 ' Others suggest short-
ening notice or otherwise varying its format to reduce the burden on
155 See Ripken, supra note 18, at 173-74. Anchoring bias refers to our tendency to
latch onto or "anchor" early information, using it as a reference point for all future
information. See id.; see also Willis, supra note 25, at 767 ("[T]oo much information
can lead a consumer to conserve effort by examining only a few aspects of a decision
156 See Latin, supra note 47, at 1233-34; Willis, supra note 25, at 769.
157 See Willis, supra note 25, at 780, 785-87.
158 See id. at 755 (citing, inter alia, George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral
Influences on Behavior, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & Hum. DECISION PROCESSES 272
(1996)).
159 See generally ARIELY, supra note 150 (explaining the when, why, and effects of
irrational human behavior); THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 3 (explaining availabil-
ity, optimism and overconfidence, and framing); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998) (drawing attention to
"cognitive and motivational problems" of individuals operating under specific laws
due to bounded rationality); Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 22 (examining the approach
of "insulating" outcomes from irrationality); Nehf, supra note 122 (exploring rational
behavior in the context of online privacy legislation and market forces).
160 See supra note 25 (assembling examples).
161 In their recent comprehensive indictment of mandated disclosure across a vari-
ety of areas, Carl Schneider and Omri Ben-Shahar are clear that advancing alternative
solutions is outside of scope. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 4, at 651 ("Our
task is not to propose an alternative."). In their conclusion, Schneider and Ben-
Shahar point toward the promise of "advice." See id. at 746-47. It is possible that they
will expand upon this solution in their forthcoming book adapted from the article.
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consumers. In privacy, this might involve converting "legalese" to
plainer language, 62 "layering" notice, 163 placing the information in a
table,16 4 or otherwise standardizing disclosure.165 Yet studies show
only marginal improvement in consumer understanding where pri-
vacy policies get expressed as tables, icons, or labels.16 6 Notice is, in
this sense, hydraulic: it is very difficult to convey complex content in a
clear and concise format.167 Earlier advertising research shows in that
context that the addition of more information will crowd out other,
relevant information.168 More fundamentally: it does not matter how
short or comprehensible a notice is if consumers never bother to read
it.169
A number of scholars and other commentators shun notice
entirely in favor of substantive restrictions on conduct. Fred Cate, for
instance, examines the failures of traditional notice in the context of
online privacy and proposes "substantive restrictions on data process-
ing designed to prevent specific harms."o7 0 Solon Barocas and Helen
Nissenbaum argue that the context surrounding the practice of target-
ing online ads by tracking consumer behavior does not support a
meaningful role for notice and support "substantive direct regulation"
instead.1 7 1 Outside of privacy, Ripken calls for regulators to "lay aside
See OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL SCHNEIDER, MoRE THAN You WANTED TO KNOW (forth-
coming 2012).
162 See Yang, supra note 35.
163 See CTR. FOR INFO. POLICY LEADERSHIP, supra note 36.
164 See LEVY & HASTAK, supra note 37, at 2 (report prepared for seven federal agen-
cies suggesting the use of tables in financial privacy disclosure).
165 Lauren Willis argues for, inter alia, a simplified "Loan Price Tag" in the lend-
ing context. Willis, supra note 25, at 820-21. Corey Ciocchetti urges for nutrition
labels filled with fair information practices. See Ciochetti, supra note 38, at 45.
166 See generally KELLEY ET AL., supra note 38 (assessing the efficacy of labels); LEVY
& H-ASTAK, supra note 37 (assessing the use of tables).
167 See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 4, at 688 ("There is rarely a good solu-
tion in principle: incomplete disclosure leaves people ignorant, but complete disclo-
sure creates crushing overload problems."); Latin, supra note 47, at 1221-23 ("Other
research findings indicate that . . . exhaustive disclosure is incompatible with clear
and vivid message formats.").
168 See Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondis-
closure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REv. 565, 583-84 (2006).
169 The author once conducted a study with a colleague in human-computer inter-
action that sought to compare the efficacy of short and long form privacy policies as
they are displayed on websites in practice. We were unable to do the comparison
because no one clicked on the privacy policy in either condition.
170 Cate, supra note 9, at 343.
171 See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 15 (manuscript at 6).
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the gospel of disclosure in favor of more substantive laws that regulate
conduct directly,"17 2 and so on.
Regulators are caught on the horns of a dilemma: do they chose
notice, with all of its apparent flaws, or do they instead select an alter-
native they perceive as inefficient or that threatens to compromise
some other value such as innovation, competition, or consumer
autonomy? The result can be a long holding pattern with regulators
continuing to rely on notice, even as criticisms of notice mount.
Online privacy, where consumer protection laws have hardly evolved
in two decades, seems to be a case in point.
It thus seems fair-important, even-to investigate whether the
deepest skeptics of notice really have made their case. Part I of this
Article argues that experience itself can constitute a radical new form
of notice. Critics of notice have not shown that this new generation of
disclosure is susceptible to the same withering critiques of privacy poli-
cies and other text-based notices. They have by and large not recog-
nized it as a phenomenon. If critics cannot make this showing, then
calls to abandon notice may turn out to be premature.
Indeed, there is reason to question whether visceral notice, not
being based on language or its symbolic equivalent, will always fail
along the same lines as traditional notice. Repeated experience does
not necessarily wear out in the same way as repeated messages, for
example.17 3 Thus, while people would come to tune out messages
posted throughout a city warning that electric cars are silent, presuma-
bly they will not stop avoiding cars just because all of them have
engine noises. Nor does the impact of visceral cues necessarily wear
off over time: the study of the effect of eyes on paying for coffee on
the honor system, for instance, was the same at week nine as week
two. 174
Or take the observation that consumers generally will not leave
the fun and functionality of a website in order to read a privacy pol-
icy.175 Privacy notice that is built into the consumer's very experience
of a website-for instance, through a requirement or request that the
part of the website where information is collected be more formal-
does not necessarily require consumers to click on anything. The
172 Ripken, supra note 18, at 147; see also Edwards, supra note 10, at 204 ("Put
bluntly, many critics simply do not think that disclosure works.").
173 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 90-91 (discussing "wear out" in the
context of computer software); Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 22, at 212 (describing
"wear out" as the phenomenon "in which consumers learn to tune out message [sic]
that are repeated too often");
174 See Bateson et al., supra note 60, at 412-13.
175 See supra notes 133-137 and accompanying text.
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effect of familiarity, formality, or anthropomorphism can be instanta-
neous, and hence the notice it might support does not necessarily cost
billions in worker productivity, as reading privacy policies reportedly
would. 7 6 Moreover, personalizing disclosure may make notice more
efficient and increase consumer incentives to visit the places where
companies make privacy disclosures.' 7 7
Yet another critique involves variability in reading comprehen-
sion or general facility with the English language. Although sensory
experiences vary,' 78 there is no reason to believe that visceral notice
will leave out any specific population due to demographics or lan-
guage comprehension in the way that a Miranda warning might. 7 9
We see some evidence of this in, for instance, the data suggesting that
the effect of design does not necessarily vary by sophistication of the
test subject. Studies have shown that the pro-social effect of robots is
the same for subjects who, prior to the experiment, had never seen a
robot before as for those who build similar robots. 80
This is not to claim that visceral notice will necessarily improve
upon ordinary notice, or that it is immune to notice's common criti-
cisms. It may be that, after a certain amount of time, people will in
fact begin to tune out even anthropomorphic cues-especially as they
are deployed in more and more contexts. New parents may react dif-
ferently to a crying baby over time. It could be that certain popula-
tions are not familiar with otherwise common technologies or do not
react the same way to a design element like formality. (Written notice
is hardly immune from the criticism of ambiguity and differential
impact.181) Or it could turn out that even the technique "showing,"
i.e., notice tailored to individual experience, cannot sustain consumer
attention long enough to convey meaningful information. These are
just a few of many possibilities.
176 See McDonald & Cranor, supra note 15, at 544.
177 Other innovations may also increase consumer exposure to privacy informa-
tion. The online gaming company Zynga recently converted its privacy policy into a
privacy game called "PrivacyVille." See Privacy Ville, ZYNGA, http://company.zynga.
com/about/privacy-center/privacyville (last visited Jan. 12, 2012). Consumers who
complete the game receive credits they may use in Zynga's other, popular games. See
id.
178 See ROBERTA LARSON DUYFF, AMERICAN DIETETIc ASSOcIATION COMPLETE FOOD
AND NUTRTION GUIDE 308 (3d ed. 2006) ("Even in the same family, people experi-
ence tastes differently. The intensity of taste depends partly on how many fungiform
papillae ... a person has on his or her tongue.").
179 See Weisselberg, supra note 25, at 1521-25.
180 See REEVES & NAss, supra note 56.
181 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Text Anxiety, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 309 (1986).
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More research is clearly needed to assess the promise and limits
of visceral notice as a regulatory strategy. The research may be hard:
given the nature of the work upon which visceral notice relies, explor-
ing the promise of experiential notice will require interdisciplinary
collaboration and long-term trials. As the next Part discusses, improp-
erly deployed visceral notice mandates could also backfire or run
afoul of the First Amendment.182 The central claim of this Article is
that such exploration is nevertheless worthwhile. Notice happens (a
lot), and it happens for a set of plausible reasons. As such, the litera-
ture around notice should countenance each viable strategy.
III. REGULATORY CONTEXT/OBJECTIONS
Part I of this Article describes the emerging technique of visceral
notice; Part II makes the case that visceral notice is worthy of further
study. In recognition of the importance of form and format, some
regulations already require that notices be placed in a prominent
location or use a particular visible font.'83 Such regulations could
eventually be extended to require or encourage more visceral design
elements. This Part addresses the regulatory challenges that visceral
notice could face were it deployed in practice. It proceeds by recog-
nizing several potential concerns and discussing possible mitigation
strategies.
A. Notice's Other Functions
This Article has focused on an important, but in a sense narrow
facet of mandatory disclosure. Specifically, it has examined the classic
requirement to supply information to consumers that will help them
protect themselves, realize their preferences, and police the mar-
ket.'84 But individual consumers or citizens are not the only ones who
read notices; the audience for notice can encompass more sophisti-
cated stakeholders such as officials, activists, or the press. Even where
the purported audience of notice is the consumer, requiring textual
disclosure on the part of companies can have other, salutary effects
not necessarily related to consumer understanding.
One possible concern around more visceral notice is that focus-
ing on the consumer experience of a product or service will under-
mine the ancillary benefits of textual disclosure. Consider two
examples, one from the context of privacy and one beyond it.
182 See infra Part III.
183 See Craswell, supra note 168, at 582.
184 See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 4, at 1 (describing the mechanism
behind mandatory disclosure); Nehf, supra note 122, at 14.
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Federal law requires that privacy terms accompany certain finan-
cial services or relationships. Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of
1999 (GLB),' 85 a regulated entity must disclose, among other infor-
mation, the categories of information it collects in connection to a
financial service and what it discloses to third parties.186 The GLB has
faced intensive criticism.' 8 7 The law requires disclosure on an initial
and annual basis at an estimated cost of hundreds of millions of dol-
lars, for instance-costs presumably passed along to the consumer
who likely never saw the disclosures.' 8 8 But as Peter Swire argues,
notice requirements such as those present in the GLB "work[ ] sur-
prisingly well as privacy legislation."' 8 9
They work well, on his view, not because consumers will actually
read and act on them. Rather, they improve privacy because of the
behavior the requirement to disclose tends to trigger. It turns out that
the requirement to describe practices may have led many companies
to self-examine and professionalize. As Swire explains:
[A] principal effect of the notices has been to require financial insti-
tutions to inspect their own practices. In this respect, the detail and
complexity of the GLB notices is actually a virtue. In order to draft
the notice, many financial institutions undertook an extensive pro-
cess, often for the first time, to learn just how data is and is not
shared between different parts of the organization and with third
parties.190
The "process of self-examination" led to a "detailed roadmap for
privacy compliance" and, ultimately, a salutary "institutionalization of
privacy" complete with a class of privacy professionals. 191 A similar
phenomenon may be at work in the case of Proposition 65. This Cali-
fornia law requires that firms and individuals post a warning at any
premises or alongside any product that may contain any of a list of
hundreds of chemicals "known to the state of California" to cause
185 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (Financial Services Modernization Act of
1999), Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 12, 15 U.S.C.).
186 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
187 See Peter P. Swire, The Surprising Virtues of the New Financial Privacy Law, 86
MINN. L. REV. 1263, 1314 (2002) ("Consumer groups, privacy advocates, and members
of Congress have also harshly criticized the GLB notices.").
188 See id. at 1313-14.
189 See id. at 1263.
190 Id. at 1316.
191 Id. at 1316-17. Kenneth Bamberger and Deirdre Mulligan make a similar
point about how uncertain regulation led to the professionalization of privacy and, in
turn, consumer-friendly privacy innovation. See Bamberger & Mulligan, supra note
12, at 294.
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birth defects or cancer. 192 Presumably the legislature was interested
in all of the typical benefits of notice over substantive regulation
related to cost and autonomy.193
The decision to warn consumers here is, again, easy to criticize.
People who come across these notices have no way to put the informa-
tion into practice.194 As such, individuals experience a "cascade of
fears" with no apparent recourse.195 But the law also led manufactur-
ers and premises owners to take stock of whether they were using the
Proposition 65 chemicals in the first instance.196 Some realized that
they were and, further, that doing so was not necessary, leading them
to abandon the chemical in favor of a presumably less toxic one. 97
In addition to its internal influences on a firm, the requirement
to disclose can help motivated outsiders assess and criticize company
practice. There are many examples of the FTC bringing enforcement
proceedings and using the company's privacy notices as evidence that
the company violated user expectations-indeed, the bulk of the
agency's enforcement activity follows this route.198 Moreover, non-
profit groups and researchers monitor privacy policies to assess how
corporate claims change or line up with known data practices.199 The
press has also begun to refer to privacy policies in reporting on online
privacy issues. 200
192 Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West 2006).
193 See supra notes 115-26 and accompanying text (discussing why notice is
popular).
194 Cf THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 90-91 (making this point about the
Homeland Security Terror Threat Alert).
195 Dalley, supra note 3, at 1123.
196 See id. at 1123-24.
197 Manufacturers of Liquid Paper, for instance, reformulated its product. SeeVis-
cusi, supra note 142, at 650. Being an information strategy, the mechanism did not
require the government to weigh the pros and cons of the chemical Liquid Paper-
and countless other products-contained.
198 See Hofmann, supra note 33 (reviewing FTC enforcement of online privacy
through 2010); see also Cate, supra note 9, at 357 ("What is immediately striking about
the FTC's approach is not only its exclusion of most FIPPS, but also its transformation
of collection limitation, purpose specification, use limitation, and transparency into
mere notice and consent.").
199 For instance, the Electronic Privacy Information Center routinely cites privacy
policies in complaints filed with the Federal Trade Commission. See, e.g., EPIC FTC
Complaint, In re Google, Inc. (Feb. 16, 2010), available at http://epic.org/privacy/
ftc/googlebuzz/GoogleBuzzSuppComplaint.pdf. For a list of complaints filed by
EPIC, see epic.org.
200 See, e.g., Julia Angwin & Tom McGinty, Sites Feed Personal Details to New Tracking
Companies, WALL ST. J. (July 30, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052
748703977004575393173432219064.html.
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The strategy of looking to companies' privacy disclosures can be
effective, but it faces at least one serious limitation: privacy policies do
not always contain relevant or helpful information. The language
tends to be very general and noncommittal about company prac-
tice. 2 0 1 This lack of detail is in a way understandable: current best
practice requires specifically that companies write privacy policies in a
way that is accessible to lay people, whom a high degree of technical
detail would alienate. 202 But this generic, accessible language also can
interfere with the ability of sophisticated outsiders to understand and
critique a given company's data practices.
Visceral notice-aimed at a rapid, sometimes focused change to a
consumer's mental model-could contain even less actionable infor-
mation from the perspective of corporate watchdogs. This is not to
say that design entirely lacks content. Scholars such as Woodrow
Harztog and Nancy Kim have begun to discuss how web design and
settings can form the basis of legal obligations in contract.203 Moreo-
ver, if consumers confront erroneous individual information in pri-
vacy "dashboards" and other techniques of showing, the FTC could
likely pursue the claim as deceptive. But generally speaking, visceral
notice may not always contain the same actionable sorts of informa-
tion as a written policy.
One promising strategy might be to split notice into separate
tracks: visceral notice based on design psychology for consumers, and
detailed technical notice available upon request to more sophisticated
parties such as regulators, journalists, and nonprofits. 204 It is not clear
consumers always need more detailed information; behavioral eco-
nomics offers several ways that more information can sometimes
201 See supra note 87 and infra note 217 for examples.
202 Fair Information Practice Principles, FED. TRADE COMM'N, http://www.ftc.gov/
reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm (last visited Jan. 12, 2012). Of course, as discussed
above, privacy policies have a long way to go to meet this target.
203 See Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 Am. U. L. REv. 1635, 1655
(2011) ('Judges should better recognize that users exposed to anthropomorphic fea-
tures are generally more receptive to the information conveyed and, thus, might
internalize that information better than fine-print legalese."); cf Woodrow Hartzog,
Promises and Privacy: Promissory Estoppel and Confidential Disclosure in Online Communities,
82 TEMP. L. REV. 891, 907 (2009) ("Certainly technological remedies for protecting
information, such as privacy settings, are useful in not only directly restricting what
can be viewed, but also in creating an environment of confidentiality. By closing or
locking away information, a community member could be seen as communicating a
preference for confidentiality for the information contained within."); Nancy Kim,
Online Contracts: Form as Function (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
204 I owe this suggestion to Berin Szoka.
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impoverish decision making.205 In any event, there would be little to
prevent the most sophisticated consumers from studying the more
detailed terms as inclined. The end result could be more effective
notice for consumers and more detailed information for watchdogs.
The two-track strategy has a second advantage: courts may be less
likely to assume that consumers have read reports geared toward
experts and regulators, and hence will not hold consumers to an
understanding they do not have. Although, as discussed, consumers
do not generally read privacy policies or terms of use, courts some-
times act as though they have in the event of a conflict.206 Empirical
assessments-for instance, by Robert Hillman-suggest that online
shoppers do not take terms of service into account when deciding
where to purchase goods or services, 207 nor are they able to bargain
for different terms.208 At the same time, such terms serve to insulate
businesses from later claims of unfairness or procedural unconsciona-
bility.209 In the event of a conflict, courts may assume the consumer
has read the policy and hold her accountable for what it describes. 210
A two-track system of visceral notice for consumers and more fulsome
notice for other, more sophisticated stakeholders could combat the
assumption that consumers had read and agreed to longer terms, and
yet preserve the advantages of transparency.2 1
Indeed, notice scholarship generally could benefit from the rec-
ognition that merely because one form of notice-say, privacy poli-
cies-happens not to work, it does not follow that no mandatory
205 See Alessandro Acquisti & Laura Brandimarte, The Economics of Plivacy, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY (Martin Peitz & Joel Waldfogel eds.,
forthcoming 2012); Nehf, supra note 122, at 5-6.
206 See, e.g., Bott v. Vistaprint USA, Inc., 392 F. App'x 327, 327-28 (5th Cir. 2010)
("A consumer cannot decline to read clear and easily understandable terms. . . ."); In
re Facebook Privacy Litig., No. C 10-02389, 791 F. Supp. 2d 705, 718 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
("Under California law, unjust enrichment is an action in quasi-contract. However,
'as a matter of law, a quasi-contract action for unjust enrichment does not lie where
... express binding agreements exist and define the parties' rights."' (quoting Vil-
lager Franchise Sys., Inc. v. Dhami, Dhami & Virk, No. CVF 04-6393, 2006 WL 224425
(E.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2006))).
207 Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-
Standard Temns Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REv. 837, 839-40 (2006) (assembling cases).
208 See id. at 840-41.
209 See id. at 842.
210 Cf id. at 839-40 (arguing that published policies may lead to safe harbors for
businesses which draft questionable language).
211 Consumers could still be held accountable for being on notice of whatever the
visceral notice conveyed-for instance, that third-party ad networks were tracking the
consumer in order to deliver targeted ads. The case would hopefully be if anything
stronger.
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information strategy could. Different problems can demand different
information solutions.
Consider another digital privacy problem, that of electronic sur-
veillance by the government. Critics identify a number of concerns
with so-called "d orders"-court orders for user information under
section 2703(d) of the Stored Communications Act. 2 12 One concern
is that law enforcement may delay the service provider from telling
the user that her records are under subpoena. 213 This makes it diffi-
cult for the user to argue to quash the subpoena-even where she
might have a very strong case. Thus, instead of a consumer who needs
information, there is a specific, identified target who stands to lose an
opportunity. Law enforcement may object to it on the basis of the
need for secrecy in some types of investigations, but an obvious rem-
edy for this problem is not terms in a privacy policy but a requirement
to notify the subject of the request.
Or consider the distinct concern that law enforcement is abusing
its subpoena power, not in the individual instance, but by issuing too
many requests overall. We might reasonably worry as a society about
the net amount of surveillance. Indeed, the overuse of National
Security Letters, once discovered, led to calls for reform.214 The rem-
edy for an overall volume of surveillance concern could be general
reporting of the number of subpoenas issued each year, just as the
Department of Justice does with respect to wiretaps. 215 Consumers
may not read them but activists and the press likely will.
Yet another issue is that consumers do not understand the due
process ramifications of storing information in the Internet
"cloud,"216 as opposed to a physical file cabinet at home. Consumers
lack this understanding because terms of use tend to be vague on this
point, saying, for instance, that the company will comply with any law-
212 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2006). The Stored Communications Act (SCA) is part of
an omnibus electronic surveillance law, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). For a comprehen-
sive discussion of the SCA, see Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications
Act, and a Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208 (2004).
213 See 18 U.S.C. § 2705 (2006).
214 See 18 U.S.C. § 2709. For proposed reform, see National Security Letters
Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1800, 111th Cong. (2009) ("To establish reasonable proce-
dural protections for the use of national security letters, and for other purposes.").
215 The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 requires the Admin-
istrative Office of the United States Courts to report applications for wiretap orders.
18 U.S.C. § 2519 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
216 That is, in a remotely located server, instead of on the computer or other hard-
ware device, often called the "client."
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ful request for information. 2 1 7 Here, the solution could involve
clearer terms or ground rules-ideally in a format that users can
digest. Some companies might commit to pushing back against
requests and thereby gain consumer trust.218
Finally, it happens that, as a quirk of federal electronic privacy
law, communications that are in storage for greater than 180 days get
lesser protection than those stored for up to 180 days.219 Users often
have no idea how long their information will be stored and we can
imagine a preference for deleting, archiving, or encrypting informa-
tion once it hits that timeframe. Here, the best remedy might be a
warning: this particular piece of information has or will lose its cur-
rent level of legal protection. 220
If anything, the fact that notice comes in various, policy-relevant
forms presents an incidental challenge to notice skepticism. Specifi-
cally, it raises the question of whether the failure of notice meaning-
fully to address a given problem stems from a kind of selection error.
If lawmakers can select the wrong form of notice for a given context, it
may not always be appropriate to jump immediately to an alternative
such as substantive regulation or otherwise throw in the towel of man-
dated information.
B. Bad Incentives
Traditional notices can be ineffective at informing consumers.
There is also evidence that notices can sometimes do more harm than
good. Privacy policies are again a good example. Few read or under-
217 See, e.g., Privacy Policy, AT&T, http://www.att.com/gen/privacypolicy?pid=
2506 (last visited Jan. 12, 2012) (providing it may share personal information "for
purposes such as: ... [c]omplying with court orders and legal process . . . ."); Privacy
Policy, SEARs, http://www.sears.com/shc/s/nb_10153_12605_NBCSprivacy?icntr=
1320375319185 (last visitedJan. 12, 2012) ("We also may provide information to regu-
latory authorities and law enforcement officials in accordance with applicable law or
when we otherwise believe in good faith that the law requires it.").
218 At least one online genetics company, for instance, commits to "use reasonable
and lawful efforts to limit the scope of any such legally required disclosure, and we
will make every attempt to notify you in advance insofar as we are legally permitted to
do so." Privacy Policy, NAVIGENIcs, http://www.navigenics.com/visitor/what we_
offer/our-policies/privacy/#disclosure (last visited Jan. 12, 2012).
219 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
220 The government has also taken the position in litigation that merely opening
an email takes it out of warrant territory. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266,
291 (6th Cir. 2010). Should this position become the law of the land, we could imag-
ine a warning prior to opening the first email on a service that it could change the
level of protection.
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stand them.2 2i But worse still, they can falsely reassure consumers: a
majority of adults in one survey saw the words "privacy policy"-
required under state law-and assumed that the company safeguards
their information in specific, but often incorrect, ways. 222 Consumers
that assume away bad practices cannot police against them.
Sometimes notice fails to accomplish its objectives because the
regulated entity takes purposive steps to reduce or reverse the impact
of notice. In the face of a city ordinance requiring restaurants to post
their hygiene grade to the public, a sandwich shop in New York City
reportedly used its suboptimal grade of "B" as the first letter in the
phrase "Best restaurant in town."2 25 A lawsuit filed in 2003 alleges that
a handset manufacturer purposefully designed consumer notices in
such a way that they were unlikely to be opened.224 There is also evi-
dence that some police officers take steps to soften or mitigate
Miranda noticeS225 and that doctors will sometimes downplay warn-
ings of side effects while emphasizing the risks of not taking
medicine. 226
If experience turns out to be in some ways a more powerful form
of notice, then would not companies turn this tool to their own advan-
tage by designing misleading websites or other interfaces? In other
words, perhaps firms would embrace the techniques behind visceral
notice, but only falsely to reassure consumers or to lull them into dis-
closing more information.
Whether design psychology gets abused in this way would seem to
depend on company incentives. 227 As Hanson and Kysar explore in
another context, companies face financial incentives to leverage their
221 See supra notes 134-38.
222 See HOOFNAGLE & KING, supra note 17, at 4. For instance, a majority of adults
surveyed believed that the presence of a privacy policy meant that the company could
not share user data with a third party without permission. See id.
223 Aaron Rutkoff, Restaurant Makes Best Out of 'B' Grade, WALL ST. J. METROPOLIS
BLOG (Sept. 17, 2010, 4:04 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2010/09/17/res-
taurant-makes-the-best-of-b-grade.
224 See Pollard v. Ericsson, Inc., 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 496, 498 (2004). The court even-
tually found against the plaintiffs. See id. at 501.
225 See Weisselberg, supra note 25, at 1557-62.
226 See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 4, at 699 (citing Jean-Marie Berthelot
et al., Informing Patients About Serious Side Effects of Drugs: A 2001 Survey of 341 French
Rheumatologists, 70JoiNrr BONE SPINE 52, 55 (2003)). As Jon D. Hanson and Douglas
A. Kysar argue in another context, firms need not even engage in this conduct know-
ingly to reduce the efficacy of product warnings. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 142,
at 637 ("[M]anufacturers have incentives to utilize cognitive biases actively to shape
consumer perceptions throughout the product purchasing context and indepen-
dently of government regulations.").
227 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 76, at 1420, 1423-25.
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knowledge of consumer habits to manipulate the market.2 2 8 Competi-
tive pressure can incentiwize misleading or otherwise manipulative dis-
closures, even absent a conscious intention on the part of the
company.229
Focusing on product safety, Hanson and Kysar suggest that strict
liability will create the proper incentives for good warning.230
Another, simpler method may be the use of goal-based, or outcome
determinative, rules. The idea is to measure the sufficiency of visceral
notice by reference to outcome-in this case, whether the consumers
had an accurate mental model of the product or service they are
using. Thus, companies would have to certify-for instance, through
an agency lab process like that of the Federal Communications Com-
mission for wireless-enabled devices, or some other independent
audit-that consumers understood how a website or other product or
service works.
The Federal Trade Commission experimented with just such an
approach as far back as 1973.231 The In re RJR Foods, Inc. v. FTC23 2
consent decree contained a safe harbor providing that RJR could get
out from under the requirements of the decree if it could show
through an independent survey that consumers were no longer con-
fused by its product.233 In 2011, Senators John Kerry and John
McCain introduced legislation that would provide a safe harbor for
companies engaged in "privacy by design" 234-a concept championed
by Canadian privacy official Ann Cavoukian 235-as determined by cer-
tified independent auditors. Privacy by design means companies keep
in mind certain aspirational best practices as they design, test, and
implement their products. Visceral notice could become a gold stan-
dard practice with respect to transparency.
228 See id.
229 See id. at 1427 (market pressures can yield this outcome "regardless of manu-
facturers' awareness of the process").
230 See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 142, at 693-745.
231 See Craswell, supra note 168, at 583. Craswell cites to William L. Wilkie & David
M. Gardner, The Role of Marketing Research in Public Policy Decision Making, 38J. MARKET-
INc 38, 41 (1974), for a summary of this approach.
232 83 F.T.C. 7 (1973).
233 See id. at 30.
234 Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, S. 799, 112th Cong. § 103
(2011).
235 See generally ANN CAvouGAN, PRIVACY By DESIGN (2009) (discussing the concept
of "privacy by design").
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Oliver Wendell Holmes notwithstanding, 236 we may wonder
about the capacity of courts or regulators to determine the sufficiency
of experience as a kind of legal notice. No doubt this assessment will
take sophisticated, interdisciplinary training on the part of agency
employees or contractors. But special expertise is one of the reasons
we defer to agencies,237 which have already engaged outside commu-
nications experts to test the efficacy of notice in the context of finan-
cial disclosure under GLB and other places. 238 And there are areas-
one is trademark-where litigants routinely argue over the impact
and intent of design using expert testimony. 239 In short, we would not
be building on empty ground: regulatory mechanisms already exist
that seek to realign company incentives and test the adequacy of
design.
C. First Amendment Concerns
Finally, a transition from text to experience could trigger addi-
tional or different scrutiny under the First Amendment. The use of
visceral notice could, in theory, implicate free speech to a greater
degree than traditional notice along at least two related lines. 240 First,
it may be that visceral notice fits uneasily within the category of
"purely factual and uncontroversial information," which occasions
lesser First Amendment scrutiny than other compelled speech. 241 Sec-
ond, even assuming that visceral notice can be designed to fit within
236 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Am. Bar Ass'n 2009)
(1881) ("The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.").
237 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984).
238 See, e.g., LEVY & HASTAK, supra note 37, at 17 (describing a study about notice
on behalf of five federal agencies and recommending the use of tables). One might
also mention the interdisciplinary expertise available to members of Congress
through the Congressional Research Service.
239 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (exam-
ining whether the Lanham Act permits the registration of a particular color as a
trademark).
240 There is a third, more subtle way in which visceral notice may implicate free
speech. Some of the methods discussed in Part I involve creating in web users the
feeling of being observed and evaluated. At the margins, this may affect what users
are willing to do or say on the web. Users may be less likely to engage in certain
categories of behavior-for instance, searching for controversial topics on the
Internet. For a full discussion of how technological interfaces can chill curiosity and
free expression by creating a feeling of being observed and evaluated, see M. Ryan
Calo, People Can Be So Fake: A New Dimension to Privacy and Technology Scholarship, 114
PENN ST. L. REV. 809 (2010).
241 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
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this less suspect category, there may be a basic sense in which regula-
tors and courts remain uncomfortable dictating website design or
other, aesthetic considerations to a company.
The First Amendment generally frowns upon the government
attempting to coerce an individual or organization to speak any partic-
ular message.242 In the extreme, this principle would seem to pre-
clude notice as a regulatory strategy, depending as it does on forcing a
company to speak about its practices in a particular way. California's
law, for instance, requires that Internet services include the words
"privacy policy" anywhere the service collects personally identifiable
information, and further that the words link to a document with spe-
cific categories of information about the company's data collection
practices. 243
The courts have carved out an exception for certain regulations
aimed at commercial speech where the primary goal is to convey fac-
tual information. 244 Thus, the state may require that a fast food com-
pany conspicuously post the calorie content of the items on its
menu.245 This exception has limits, however, even when it comes to
truthful information. California law at one point required that credit
card companies disclose to individual consumers the length of time it
would take them to pay off their balance through minimum pay-
ments. 246 The companies fought back on free speech grounds. They
ultimately prevailed in court on a federal preemption argument, but
not before a sympathetic hearing of their speech claim. 2 4 7
Minimum payment disclosure rules are controversial, if at all,
because they implicitly condemn and reduce a specific practice that is
profitable for credit card manufactures but likely has a negative
impact on most consumers. Recent rules promulgated by the Food
and Drug Administration around cigarette health warnings provide a
more recent and vivid example. In June of 2011, the FDA published a
final rule requiring the prominent display of "graphic warnings" on
242 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995)
(describing compelled speech as "presumptively unconstitutional"); Wooley v. May-
nard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
243 CAL. BUs. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575-22579 (West 2008).
244 See Zauderer, 417 U.S. at 651.
245 The new Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 (2010), for instance, directs the Food and Drug Administration to promul-
gate rules around calories counts in fast food restaurants. Many states and municipali-
ties already have such rules in force.
246 CAL. CfV. CODE § 1748.13 (West 2009). Thanks to Chris Hoofnagle for this
example.
247 Am. Bankers Ass'n v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1018 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
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cigarette packages.248 The new warnings included images such as a
cadaver lying on an autopsy table or a plume of cigarette smoke envel-
oping an infant.
The cigarette industry won a preliminary injunction against the
regulations in federal court on the basis that the graphic images were
likely to violate their rights as against compelled speech under the
First Amendment. 2 4 9 Interestingly, the court based its decision in
large part on the extent to which the warnings seemed calculated not
better to apprise smokers of factual risk, but to reduce smoking.
According to the court, the "emotional response [the images] were
crafted to induce is calculated to provoke the viewer to quit, or never
start, smoking: an objective wholly apart from disseminating purely
factual and uncontroversial information."25 0
The concern that more visceral notice might not survive First
Amendment scrutiny highlights the importance of the distinction
highlighted in Part I of this Article. The FDA's notice is "visceral" in
the sense that it draws upon consumer psychology to achieve greater
salience. But the rules are open to the criticism that they stray too far
from the central goal of notice, which is better information. Indeed,
as the court repeatedly notes in deciding against the agency, the FDA
justified its new rules not by reference to what the consumer would
understand about the risks of smoking, but by reference to the impact
the images had on cigarette consumption in other jurisdictions where
graphic warnings were already in place.251 The FDA was arguably not
really using a notice strategy.252
It may well be a reasonable goal to frighten current and potential
smokers, given the established risks to health and the role of nicotine
addiction. But it is not a notice goal. The purpose of visceral notice is,
ideally, the same as with any notice: to ensure consumers have the
correct mental model of the product or service and can make deci-
sions accordingly.253 Again-and as the example of smoking warnings
highlights-achieving salience without resorting purely to behavioral
248 Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg.
36,628 (June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
249 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, Civil No. 11-1482 (RJL), 2011 WL
5307391, at *11 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2011).
250 Id. at *5.
251 See id. at *5-10.
252 See id. at *7 ("As best I can discern, however, the Government's primary pur-
pose is not, as it claims, merely to inform."). But see Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v.
United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 530 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (rejecting a challenge to the
same graphic warning labels on the basis that they merely inform).
253 See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
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triggers is very difficult and requires careful, interdisciplinary study.
On this view, the First Amendment helps to safeguard an appropriate
role for visceral notice and highlights the importance of maintaining
its allegiance to the classic notice mechanism.
Regardless of whether the goal is informing or incentivizing, reg-
ulators may take issue with dictating aesthetic considerations to a com-
pany at all. You can agree that design psychology holds promise in
better informing consumers of the risks and realities of data privacy,
but nevertheless bristle at the notion that California regulators deter-
mine the look and feel of Google or Mozilla's newest service. The
idea is that the government should not be involved in how a company
presents itself or its services because placing limits on design options
could hamper innovation, or merely that dictating the appearance of
a website feels too much like censorship.
A possible middle ground might be found in the use of safe
harbors and other, incentive-based mechanisms already described in
this Part. The idea would be that-rather than tell a company it must
use specific, visceral interventions-regulators and courts could point
to such techniques as best practice, which in turn will reduce the like-
lihood of negative outcomes such as enforcement proceedings under
the FTC Act. This would permit companies to experiment with differ-
ent designs and help ensure that governments are not determining
how services appear. Moreover, compliance would ultimately be vol-
untary, helping further to mitigate the burden on speech.
CONCLUSION
Mandatory notice is a popular but controversial form of regula-
tion. It is popular because it is perceived by government and industry
as easier, cheaper, and less invasive than restricting conduct. It is con-
troversial in that many are skeptical that notice ever works in practice.
The arguments against notice, in online privacy and elsewhere, tend
to follow the same pattern: notice is ineffective because consumers
never see it and, when they do, they cannot make much use of it. The
understandable conclusion that notice does not work in practice has
led skeptics to reject notice entirely as a regulatory strategy-an action
that would send regulators back to the proverbial square one.
It may well be that, no matter how popular or advantageous a
strategy, we need to abandon mandatory notice in favor of something
else. This Article has argued that extreme skeptics of notice move too
fast, however, in rejecting the potential of privacy notice to warn or
inform consumers. Emerging strategies that do not necessarily rely on
words or symbols to convey salient information to consumers may not
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be susceptible to the same withering critiques as more traditional
notice. Especially given the paucity of alternatives, such "visceral"
notice strategies are worthy of further exploration to ensure we know
the full panoply of options available to regulators and courts.
In short, this Article has identified a radical new dimension to
notice in one context and urged further investigation. Without it,
reports of the death of notice remain exaggerated. Although the
focus of the Article has been online privacy-where notice is among
the only affirmative obligations websites face and where opportunities
for innovation are perhaps unique-its insights go beyond privacy or
the Internet. We might explore the potential of visceral notice in con-
texts as variable as traffic safety, cyberbullying, and water purity.
What is needed in each instance is a commitment on the part of
regulators and industry to innovate around notice, an open mind on
the part of critics, and a willingness within multiple disciplines to
assess the results of such innovation. The way forward in notice is
difficult but, this Article has argued, it is also worthwhile.
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